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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 27, 1986, the International Court. of Justice issued its
landmark decision Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua.' A welcome feature of the Court's decision was its reliance
on the principle ofjus cogens,2 a fundamental doctrine of international
law.
1. (Nicar. v. U. S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14 [hereinafter Nicar. v. U.S. Case]. The International
Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principle judicial organ of the United Nations. U.N. CHARTER
art. 92; Statute of the ICI, Oct. 24, 1945, art. 1 [hereinafter Stat. ICJ]. The ICJ has jurisdic.
tion, inter alia, to interpret treaties and decide any question of international law. id, art. 36
(2)(a),(b). To ascertain the law, the Court is bound to apply international conventions, cus-
toms, generally recognized principles of law, and decisions and teachings of judges, scholars
and writers. Id. art. 38.
2. Nicar. v. U.S. Case, supra note 1, 1986 I.C.J. at 100-01, 113-15 (opinion of the Court),
151-53 (Singh, J., separate opinion), 199-200 (Sette-Camara, J., separate opinion). The ICY has
played a significant role in developing the principle ofjus cogens. For a thorough discussion of
the ICJ's role in developing international law, see Lauterpacht, The Development of Interna.
tional Law by the International Court 20-22 (1958) (ICJ decisions are both evidence of and a
source of international law).
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Despite its doctrinal preeminence, the term jus cogens defies simple
definition. Its use in human rights litigation can be undermined by its
mirage-like quality. To compound the problem, the term jus cogens is
practically absent from the United States' legal arena, even in human
rights actions.
Human rights law has unfolded dramatically since the promulgation
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.3 Lawyers are becoming
more accustomed to invoking international standards. Lawyers repre-
sent the legal rights of persons in other countries, especially when such
persons are in countries with no effective judiciary to enforce rights.
Even so, the failure of the United States to ratify the major human rights
treaties has made some United States lawyers hesitant to utilize interna-
tional standards.4 As a result, attorneys try to use domestic law in situa-
tions in which it is patently inadequate. Courts, on the other hand, are
rarely presented with international human rights norms, and as a result,
have little experience in adjudicating them. Additionally, in spite of
modest success in utilizing United States courts to redress gross viola-
tions of international law occurring in other countries, the courts are
chary of addressing alleged violations by the United States whether such
violations occur domestically or abroad. Even with recognition of the
gravity of certain alleged violations of human rights or humanitarian law
or the existence of relevant United States treaties, courts have invoked
doctrines such as the political question doctrine and standing to preclude
redress for illegal government policy, be it domestic or foreign.
Most areas of great human rights concern-illegal treaties, humani-
tarian (armed conflict) law, apartheid, genocide, torture, violations of the
3. G.A. Res. 217(I)A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of
Human Rights].
4. Of the major human rights and humanitarian law treaties, the United States has rati-
fied very few; some examples of those ratified are: The Hague Convention of 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, T.S. 539, 205 Parry's T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague Convention]; The Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949, in force Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362,75 U.N.T.S. 31 (armed
forces in the field); 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.LA.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (armed forces at sea); 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (prisoners of war); 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.IA.S.
No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 267 (civilians) [hereinafter Geneva Conventions]; The Slavery Conven-
tion, in force Mar. 9, 1927, 46 Stat. 2183, T.S. No. 778, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, as amended July 7,
1955; Protocol to the Slavery Convention, in force Dec. 7, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 479, T.I.A.S. No.
3532, 182 U.N.T.S. 51 and 212 U.N.T.S. 17; Supplement to the Slavery Convention in force
Apr. 30, 1957, 18 U.S.T. 3201, T.I.A.S. No. 6418, 266 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, in force Oct. 4, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267;
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, in force Mar. 31, 1953,27 U.S.T. 1909, T.LA.S.
No. 8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, in force Jan 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (in force for U.S. Feb. 23, 1989) [hereinaf-
ter Genocide Convention].
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right to life and the plight of refugees-are governed by jus cogens. One
way to enhance protection of human rights in domestic actions is to in-
corporatejus cogens, becausejus cogens norms exist and are enforceable
independently of treaties, and are immune from many judicial doctrines
that have frustrated redress.
This Article defines jus cogens, and discusses its accommodation
into the scheme of international and domestic law. It shows how jus
cogens has developed as a natural law concept while being incorporated
as part of legal positivism and modem international law. It demonstrates
thatjus cogens is compatible with the major legal systems-common law,
civil law and socialist law. This Article presentsjus cogens as the highest
category of customary international law, and enumerates some of its
widely accepted substantive norms. Then the procedural aspects of jus
cogens are developed, with emphasis on howjus cogens overcomes judi-
cial doctrines that have been invoked by courts to preclude enforcement
of rights. The Article concludes by showing thatjus cogens, under a vari-
ety of other names, is no stranger to United States jurisprudence but has
instead been a major influence on the development of human rights.
II. DEFINITIONS OF JUS COGENS
The definition ofjus cogens has challenged the most expert of schol-
ars.5 Some stress its substance,6 some its procedural effect, 7 and some its
character of upholding world order.' The literal translation-cogent
5. See Gormley, The Right to Life and the Rule of Non-Derogability: Peremptory Norms
ofJus Cogens in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 120, 122 (B. Ramcharan, cd.
1985) (need for "workable definition" in spite of inability to "identify full scope"). One au-
thority states jus cogens "beguiles us." Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Funda
mental to International Society, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 585 (1988). See also, Janis, The Nature of
Jus Cogens, in colloquy with Turpel & Sands, Peremptory International Law and Sovereignty:
Some Questions, 3 CoNN. INT'L L. J. 359, 364, 370 (1988). A leading authority, however,
claims "no definition is necessary, because the idea ofjus cogens is clear in itself." Verdross,
1963 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 66, 67.
6. See, eg., Tunkin, The Contemporary Theory of Soviet International Law, 31 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBLEMS 177, 185 (1978) (describingjus cogens norms by their anti-colonial nature,
stressing the norms of the right to self-determination, freedom from exploitation and peace),
Fitzmaurice, The Future of Public International Law and of the International Legal System in
the Circumstances of Today, 1973 INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 323 (listingjus cogens
norms); Domb, Jus Cogens and Human Rights, 6 ISR. Y.B. ON HuM. R'rs. 104 (1976) (listing
Jus Cogens norms).
7. See, eg., A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCES; AND PROSPECT 96 (1987);
Abi-Saab, Introduction in THE CONCEPT OF Jus Cogens IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: Papers
and Proceedings 10 (1966) [hereinafter CONCEPT OF Jus COGENS]; Gormley, supra note 5.
8. See Christenson, supra note 5.
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law--provides meaningful guidance: a primary attribute ofjus cogens is
that it is "compelling." The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties1°
uses the most widely used English term for jus cogens: "peremptory
norm."11 Other English language terms are "fundamental," "inaliena-
ble" or "inherent."12 "Essential" or "overriding principles" are also fre-
quently used. 3 International human rights instruments usually contain
these terms. For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"4
uses "inherent dignity"" and "equal and inalienable rights."16  The
American Convention on Human Rights17 uses "essential rights."'"
An influential modem definition ofjus cogens was given by the Mex-
ican delegate to the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties:
"The rules ofjus cogens [are] those rules which derive from principles
that the legal conscience of mankind deem[s] absolutely essential to coex-
istence in the international community." '19 The delegate's emphasis on
the importance ofjus cogens in maintaining the existence of international
9. WEBSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. unabridged) (1934) ("co-
gent: L. cogens, pres. part. of cogere to drive together, to force... compelling or having the
power of compelling or constraining; esp., appealing forcibly or conclusively to the mind or
reason; convincing or strongly tending to convince."). One delegate to the United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties commented on the curious fact that "neither the Interma-
tional Law Commission nor jurists in general had managed to find a modem equivalent for the
Latin term jus cogens." U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st and 2d Sess. Vienna
Mar. 26 - May 24, 1968, U.N. Doe. A/CONF./39/1 1/Add. 2 (1971), Statement of Mr. Fattal
(Lebanon) at 297 [hereinafter U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties]. In that respect, jus
cogens joins habeas corpus.
10. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in force Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
11. Id. art. 53 ("[Jus cogens are] peremptory norms of international law."). The Random
House Dictionary (abridged) (1978) ("peremptory... 1. leaving no opportunity for denial or
refusal. 2. imperious or dictatorial. 3. law, absolute or final.). See, eg., McDougal, Lasswell, &
Laisman, World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decisions in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 99 (C. Black & L Falk eds. 1969) ('gus cogens, peremptory
norms").
12. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 512 (3d ed. 1979) ("Ju-
rists have from time to time attempted to classify rules, or rights and duties, on the interna-
tional plane by use of terms like 'fundamental' or, in respect to rights, 'inalienable' or
'inherent'.").
13. Id. at 513. Instead of "principle," some scholars refer tojus cogens as a "notion" or
"concept."
14. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 3.
15. Id. 1st preamb. para.
16. Id.
17. American Convention on Human Rights, in force July 18, 1978, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36,
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
18. Id. 2d preamb. para.
19. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, supra note 9, Statement of Mr. Suarez (Mex-
ico) at 294; see Christenson, supra note 5.
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law was echoed in an opinion of the German Federal Constitutional
Court:
The quality of such peremptory norms [jus cogens] may be attributed
only to such legal rules as are firmly rooted in the legal conviction of
the community of nations and are indispensable to the existence of the
law of nations as an international legal order and the observance of
which can be required by all members of the international
community.20
Other definitions emphasize the binding, mandatory nature of jus
cogens norms.21 If the will of a state conflicts with ajus cogens norm, the
operation ofjus cogens requires the state to acquiesce to the jus cogens
norm. 22 The binding nature of jus cogens limits the substance of valid
treaties or international agreements 23 and makes agreements that conflict
with its norms void.24 The binding, peremptory nature ofjus cogens does
not allow for derogation. 25 For this reason,jus cogens norms must invali-
date any instrument, judicial order, executive order or legislative act that
contravenes them.26
20. Judgment of Apr. 7, 1965, Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfGE, W. Ger., quoted In
Riesenfeld, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law: In the Light of a Recent
Decision of the German Supreme Constitutional Court, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 511, 513 (S. Riescn-
feld trans. 1966).
21. Jus cogens "connot[es] a rule of law which is peremptory in the sense that it is binding
irrespective of the will of individual parties, in contrast tojus dispositivum, a rule capable of
being modified by contrary contractual engagements.... ." ENCYCLOPAEDIc DICTIONARY O
INTERNATIONAL LAW 201 (C. Parry ed. 1986) (quoting G. SCHWARZENDEROER, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND ORDER 5 (1971)). Jus cogens are "rules universally recognized and so
firmly established as to need no justification and as binding on all nations belonging to the
community of nations." Paul, The Legal Consequences of Conflict Between a Treaty and an
Imperative Norm of General International Law (Jus Cogens), 21 OSTERREICHISCHE ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FOR 6FFENTLICHES REcHT 19 (1971).
22. Gormley, supra note 5, at 120 (/us cogens norms restrict the will of states). M. JANIS,
AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-31 (1988): "Jus cogens... is the notion that
there exist some rules of international law so fundamental that they prohibit acts by states even
if such conduct is expressly sanctioned by state consent."
23. 1 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 (Lauterpacht ed. 1970) (Treaties
cannot change customary law that isjus cogens); Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in
International Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 55, 59 (1966).
24. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 555 (1909) ("Just as treaties
have no binding force when concluded with reference to an illegal object, so they lose their
binding force when through the progressive development of International Law they become
inconsistent with the latter.").
25. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 53 ("a peremptory norm... [is] a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character."). J. KUNZ, THE CHANGING LAW O
NATIONs 102 (1968) ("internationaljus cogens, which cannot be derogated,. .").
26. Internationaljus cogens norms require modification of conflicting United States for-
eign policy. Regrettably, Congress has floundered in efforts to enforce existing human rights
[Vol. 12
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A. Jus Cogens as Customary Law
Jus cogens norms are the highest rules of international law,27 and
function essentially as "very strong rule[s] of customary international
law."2 Customary international law is the general practice of states
which, over a period of time, becomes binding law through repetition and
adoption. Customary law is judicially enforceable in United States
courts,2" and is found by studying the "customs and usages of civilized
nations; and as evidence of these, the works of jurists and commenta-
tors."3 ° The elements of a norm of customary international law were set
out by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights:
a) a concordant practice by a number of states with reference to a type
of situation falling within the domain of international relations; b) a
continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of
time; c) a conception that the practice is required by or consistent with
prevailing international law; and d) general acquiescence in the prac-
tice by other states.
31
There is no established rule for exactly how many countries must
participate for a practice to become custom, though complete universal-
ity is not required.32 Nor must a state be in perfect conformity with the
legislation. See D. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CONGRESS RE-
CONSIDERED 51-79 (1988).
27. Committee of United States Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
28. A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATrONAL LAw 132 n. 73 (1971).
One scholar placesjus cogens law even higher than customary law, calling it "international
constitutional law... the very foundations of the international legal system." Janis, supra
note 5, at 363.
29. See, eg., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820) (customary law re-
garding piracy); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (customary law regarding coastal
fishing and war); Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (customary rules of war); Filartiga v.
Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (customary law of torture).
30. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
163-64, 214-15 (1894)). The sources of.customary law are also set out in the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Stat. ICY art.38(b)(c)(d).
31. Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147, 166, OEA/ser. L/V/I1.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987)
[hereinafter Roach Death Penalty Case]. The International Court of Justice considered what
factors must be present to create customary law from a treaty or treaty provision in the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.) 1969 LCJ. 3, 41-43 [hereinaf-
ter North Sea Cases]. Denmark and Netherlands claimed that the boundary rule of the Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf treaty had become customary law and therefore binding on
non-party Germany. The Court, in disagreeing, gave the following test: the treaty or treaty
provision must be norm-creating in character, there must be wide-spread and representative
State practice even by non-party States; there must be indication of the norm in the opinion
jurs; and a sufficient lapse of time. Id. at 41-42. Time could be quite short if the other factors
are strongly present. Id.
32. Roach Death Penalty Case, supra note 31, at 167. See also, Sohn, "Generally Ac-
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law at all times to be held to recognize a rule as customary law." How-
ever, if a state consistently objects as a customary rule is emerging, it
may, by becoming a persistent objector, prevent the rule from becoming
binding upon it, although other states would still be bound.
34
Once an international norm becomes jus cogens, it is absolutely
binding on all states, whether they have persistently objected or not.3 5
The rule is very clear: when a norm acquiresjus cogens status, it is bind-
ing even on persistent objector states.36
As a stronger than ordinary rule of customary law, jus cogens nulli-
fies acts and treaties that contravene its rules.37 This power is one of the
most important attributes ofjus cogens. Because customary law evolves,
acts by governments could ripen into customary international law or be
cepted" International Rules, 6 WASH. L. REv. 1073, 1074 (19116); Akehurst, Custom as a
Source of International Law, 1974-75 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 1, 16-19.
33. Nicar. v. U.S. Case, supra note 1 at 98 ("The Court does not consider that, for a rule
to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous con-
formity with the rule."); see North Sea Cases, supra note 31, at 229 (Lachs, J., dissenting on
other grounds)(to become binding, a rule of international law "need not pass the test of univer-
sal acceptance").
34. Roach Death Penalty Case, supra note 31, at 167; see Sohn, supra note 32, at 1074
("The fact that a few states object to the establishment of a new rule or to a revision of an old
one does not prevent the birth of the rule. At most, a persistent objector... is not bound by
the rule; that state cannot, however, prevent the emergence of the rule binding all non-ob-
jecting states."); Stein, The Approach of a Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent
Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L. J. 457 (1985); Colson, How Persistent Must
the Objector Be? 61 WASH. L. REv. 957 (1986).
35. Nicar. v. U.S. Case, supra note 1 at 98 ("If a State acts in a way prima facie incompati.
ble with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications
contained within the rule itself... the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than
weaken the rule."). The Court found the United States bound by the jus cogens principle
prohibiting the use of force though the United States "objected" by claiming justifications. Id.
at 114, 238.
36. Roach Death Penalty Case, supra note 31, at 168 ("For a norm of customary interna-
tional law to be binding on a State which has protested the norm, it must have acquired the
status ofjus cogens."). The United States has been a persistent objector to the prohibition of
the death penalty, including in its actions before the Organization of American States (OAS),
The Commission found the application of the death penalty to children as a violation of ajus
cogens rule. Accordingly, the United States objections had no effect. International Court of
Justice, Judge Lachs (dissenting), recognized the effect of this rule: "[n]or can a general rule
[of customary international law] which is not of the nature ofjus cogens prevent some States
from adopting an attitude apart. They may have opposed the rule from its inception and may
... decide upon different solutions of the problem involved." North Sea Cases, supra note 31,
at 229.
37. M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (5th ed.
1984) ("What is said [in the Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53] about treaties being
void [if they conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law] would also probably
apply equally to local custom. The reason why local custom is not mentioned is because the
purpose of the Convention was to codify the law of treaties only,").
[Vol. 12
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incorporated into treaties. However, when state practices, including ju-
dicial, executive or legislative acts, violatejus cogens principles, they are
legally void and have no effect on the body of custom which becomes
law.3" The nullifying characteristic of jus cogens also explains the em-
phasis on the non-derogability of certain customary principles in interna-
tional law:39 non-derogability signals that a customary international rule
isjus cogens.4
An important requirement of customary law is that it fit into a vari-
ety of legal theories and regimes. Jus cogens not only is naturally com-
patible with major legal theories and domestic legal systems, it has
played a key role in the development of a unified body of international
law.
1. Jus Cogens and Natural Law
Jus cogens is sometimes explained as arising from or synonymous
with principles of natural law.41 Whether or not synonymous, jus cogens
is clearly an attribute of natural law. Natural law is a theory of law that
acknowledges unwritten standards of behavior as a primary source of
law.4 2 Natural law has either religious, secular or philosophical
38. Abi-Saab, Introduction to CONCEPT OF Jus CoGENs, supra note 7, at 10.
39. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 24, at 555 ("Just as treaties have no binding force when
concluded with reference to an illegal object, so they lose their binding force when through the
progressive development of International Law they become inconsistent with the latter....'I.
E. VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 55, § 9 (J. Chitty trans. 1870) ("Whence as this law is
immutable and the obligations that arise from it necessary and indispensable, nations can
neither make any changes in it by their conventions, dispense with it in their own conduct nor
reciprocally release each other from the observance of it.").
40. See T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION 58-60 (1987). There is no derogation permitted from certain articles in the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
reprinted in 6 LL.M. 368 (1967) art. 4. The Covenant is widely viewed as a codification of
customary international law. Therefore, those provisions at least are binding even on non-
ratifying States. However, only one of the Covenant's non-derogable rights, interdiction on
debtor's prison, may not yet be universally accepted asjus cogens. The Covenant's other non-
derogable rights are: life (art. 6); freedom from torture (art. 7); freedom from slavery and
servitude (art. 8).
41. See McDougal, Lasswell, & Laisman, supra note 11; see M. JANIS, supra note 22, at 53
("Rather close to natural law is the notion ofjus cogens, compelling law.").
42. IV E. BuRKE, WoRKs, 165-66 (1791) ("We have obligations to mankind at large,
which are not in consequence of any special voluntary pact. They arise from the relation of
man to man, and the relation of man to God, which relations are not matters of choice."). E.
KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 172-73, 183 (1915). ("In all these twistings and turnings of an
immoral doctrine of expediency... men cannot get away from the idea of right in their private
any more than in their public relations .... Right must be held sacred by man, however great
the cost and sacrifice to the ruling power."). R. POUND, LAW AND MORALS 87 (1924) ("Al-
ready there is a revival of natural law.., a creative natural law that would enable us to make
19891
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sources.
4 3
Secular natural law (jus naturale), the basis of many legal systems,
44
is a universal standard based upon a common humanity that can be ar-
rived at by reason and thought.45 European and European-based legal
systems owe much to natural law philosophy of classical writers such as
Plato,46 Sophocles47 and Cicero.4  The early legal authorities incorpo-
of our received legal materials, as systematized by the legal science of the last century, a living
instrument of justice in the society of today and of tomorrow.").
43. See generally, R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHIILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922)
(survey on nature of law). Religious natural law is the basis of many legal systems. Chinese
Confucianism was a moral code that influenced Chinese and East Asian law and politics for
centuries. Taoism was also very influential in China. The TAO-TE, CHING (attributed to Lao
Tzu), the primary written authority of the Taoist school, teaches that there is a universal
governing principle (Tao). Lao Tzu instructs rulers how to rule in harmony with the Tao. See
W. DE BARY, W. CHAN & B. WATSON, SOURCES OF CHINESE TRADITION (1960). Early
Japanese law developed from a strong religious tradition. Legal, social and religious rules were
not distinguished, and the law was the will of the gods as declared by the ruler. Later, Codes
modeled on Chinese codes were written, based on.Confucian ethics. See Y. NODA, INTRO-
DUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW (A. Angelo, trans. 1976). In Islam, the foundation of all law is
the shari'a, the law of Allah. The basis of knowing the divine law is the Quran, accepted as the
literal word of God as revealed to His prophet Muhammad. Many Muslims also consult the
Traditions (sunna), which are the traditional ways in which the prophet or the community of
believers follow the law; some also consult Consensus (ima'), which is the consensus of the
companions of the prophet and their immediate successors regarding the law, and Analogy
(qias), used to ascertain the law when a question is similar to one already answered in the
Quran. A. LAMBTON, STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM 1-12 (1981). Tradi-
tional Jewish law (Halakha) is based on the Torah. Christian precepts were incorporated into
Canon Law and early common-law and used widely in Europe by the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries.
44. See generally NATURAL LAW AND WORLD LAW: ESSAYs TO COMMEMORATE TIlE
60TH BIRTHDAY OF KOTARO TANAKA (1954); Suy, Internationalfus Cogens: a Review of the
Literature in CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS, supra note 7, 18.
45. J. MAITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW 61 (D.C. Anson trans.,
1943) ("[Natural law is] an order or a disposition which human reason can discover and ac-
cording to which the human will must act in order to attune itself to the necessary ends of the
human being.").
46. PLATO, LAWS in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 1445 (Hamilton & Cairns
eds. 1963) ("[Some people wrongly] declare that the really and naturally laudable is one thing
and the conventionally laudable quite another, while as for right, there is absolutely no such
thing as a real and natural right, that mankind are eternally disputing about rights and altering
them, and that every change thus made, once made, is from that moment valid, though it owes
its being to artifice and legislation, not to anything you could call nature.").
47. SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE, lines 451-457 (Antigone to King Creon in response to
Creon's decree to leave her brother Polyneices' corpse unburied) ("Nor did I think your orders
were so strong that you, a mortal man, could overrun the gods' unwritten and unfailing laws.
Not now, nor yesterday's, they always live, and no one knows their origin in time.").
48. CICERO, DE OFFICnS, Book 3, Ch. 4, quoted in Vattel, supra note 39, at 139 ("All
mankind should lay it down as their constant rule of action, that individual and general advan-
tage should be the same: for, if each man strives to grasp every advantage for himself, all the
ties of human society will be broken. And, if nature ordains that man should feel interested in
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rated classical natural law into their treatises on the law of nations.49
The major thesis of Grotius was the natural law basis of international
law,50 a theme heavily relied upon by Vattel. 51 Concern over whether
nations with different cultural and religious bases could participate in a
common international law was minimized when secular natural law be-
came predominant over religious natural law in the 19th and 20th centu-
ries. The basis for international relations was universally accepted to be
the commonality of humankind and the mutual benefit of states.52 All
cultures were viewed as acknowledging the same fundamental principles.
[I]t is by virtue of natural law that the Law of Nations and positive law
take on the force of law, and impose themselves upon the conscience
.... There is a dynamism which impels the unwritten law to flower
forth in human law and to render the latter ever more perfect and just
.I... It is in accordance with this dynamism that the rights of the
human person take political and social form in the community.53
the welfare of his fellow-man, whoever he be, and for the single reason that he is a man,-it
necessarily follows, that, according to the intentions of nature, all mankind must have one
common interest."). For other, slightly more interpretive translations, see ON MORAL OBLI-
GATION (J. Higginbotham trans. 1967) and ON DUTIES (HI. Edinger trans. 1974).
49. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, supra note 9, Statement of Mr. Suarez (Mex-
ico) at 294 ("In international law the earliest writers, including the great Spanish forerunners
of Grotius, had been deeply imbued with the principles of the then prevailing natural law.
They had therefore postulated the existence of principles that were derived from reason, prin-
ciples which were of absolute and permanent validity and from which human compacts could
not derogate.").
50. H. GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLi Ac PAciS LIBRi TREs PROLEGOMENA, §§ 8, 9, & 30 at
12-13, 21 (F. Kelsey trans. 1964) (1925) ("This maintenance of the social order... which is
consonant with human intelligence, is the source of law properly so called.... [I]t is meet for
the nature of man, within the limitations of human intelligence, to follow the direction of a
well-tempered judgement, being neither led astray by fear or the allurement of immediate plea-
sure, nor carried away by rash impulse. Whatever is clearly at variance with such judgement is
understood to be contrary also to the law of nature, that is, to the nature of man.... For the
principles of the law of nature, since they are always the same, can easily be brought into a
systematic form; but the elements of positive law, since they often undergo change and are
different in different places, are outside the domain of systematic treatment, just as other no-
tions of particular things are."). See Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law,
1946 Brarr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1.
51. E. VATrEL, supra note 39, at 381 ("The law of nature, whose object it is to promote
the welfare of human society, and to protect the liberties of all nations... recommends the
observance of the voluntary law of nations, for the common advantage of states....").
52. Id. at 138-39 ("From the manner in which we have established the obligation of per-
forming the offices of humanity, it plainly appears to be solely founded on the nature of man.
Wherefore, no nation can refuse them to another, under pretence of its professing a different
religion: to be entitled to them, it is sufficient that the claimant is our fellow-creature.").
53. J. MARrrAiN, supra note 45, at 70-71. See eg., The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253,
297 (1814) (Marshall, C.., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The law of nations is a
law founded on the great and immutable principles of equity and natural justice.").
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Modem human rights law is based on the natural law tenet that human
beings have rights by virtue of being human. The human rights instru-
ments do not create rights, they merely recognize them.
5 4
2. Jus Cogens and Legal Positivism
At first glance, legal positivism appears to be hostile tojus cogens:
legal positivism in its pure form regards as law only specifically enacted
rules.5 5 Unwritten rules or standards are invalid. An extreme positivist
argues that every law requires a remedy: the sovereign must have the
ability to implement a law and impose penalties on law-breakers for it to
be law. 6 Wide acceptance of positivism in international law could defeat
the operation ofjus cogens principles except those specifically set out in
treaties, and then only as against ratifying states.
Positivism reacted against excessive use of unwritten laws, defended
by arbitrary references to custom or by unrestrained judicial power.
57
Positivists believe written rules avoid vagueness and arbitrary judgments,
and make the law and its implementation more just. Positivists stress
that laws are value-neutral.58
There has been increasing erosion of adamant -positivist influence in
international law. Even the value-neutral claim has been substantially
refuted by many authors.59 It is now accepted even by the strictest posi-
tivists that positivism necessarily requires using moral considerations or
value judgments as to which is the better theory about the nature of
law.60
54. Henkin, Introduction to THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 15 (Henkin ed. 1981).
55. See generally H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (A. Wedberg
trans. 1945); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
56. H.L.A. HART, supra note 55, at 18-25 (laws are orders backed by threats); T. HonnEs,
THELEVIATHAN 86 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1947) ("BONDS, by which men are bound, and
obliged ... have their strength, not from their own nature.., but from fear of some evil
consequence upon the rupture.").
57. For example, abuses of the Star Chamber under James I and Charles I of England.
See H. HALLAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 349-73 (London, 8th ed.
1867); see also F. W. MAITLAND & F. C. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL His-
TORY, 118-20 (1915).
58. See generally Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593 (1958); H.L.A. HART, supra note 55.
59. H.L.A. HART, supra note 55, at 199 ("The law of every modem state shows at a
thousand points the influence of both the accepted social morality and wider moral ideals.").
See generally Cohen, The Myth of Neutrality in Positive Legal Theory, 31 AM. J. JURiS. 97
(1986); D'Amato, The Moral Dilemma of Positivism, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 43 (1985).
60. MaeCormick, A Moralistic Case for A-Moralistic Law? 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 20
(1985) ("All [legal questions] are morally loaded. None can be answered without staking out
[Vol. 12
Jus Cogens
3. Jus Cogens and the Merging of Natural Law and Positive
Law Theories in Modem History
Positivist and natural law theories are increasingly viewed as com-
plementary, rather than oppositional.61 This has had a favorable effect
on the development of customary international law as a whole, andjus
cogens in particular. The positivist view that all sovereign-made law is
law and must be obeyed has yielded to analysis of the underlying justice
of law in determining its validity.62 Legal systems function under a posi-
tivist approach until confronted with an unjust law. Then the natural
law principle, especially one that isjus cogens, overrides the unjust law.
The result, even for a positivist, is that the unjust law is not valid law-it
has no authority behind it and need not be obeyed.63
Modem international law has merged theories of natural and posi-
tive law; in part because natural law concepts of a superior order have
been transformed into positive law through treaties and in part because
of the development of customary international law.
4. Universality of Jus Cogens in Legal Systems
An aspect of the universality ofjus cogens is its presence in national
legal systems regardless of the type of national legal system. The three
major legal systems-common law, civil law and socialist law-all incor-
porate principles ofjus cogens.
a. The Common Law System
The common law legal system utilizes judicial rulings rather than
Codes to determine the law. In England, there is not even a written Con-
some moral position. The ideas of harm or freedom or welfare that they introduce into the
discourse are morally loaded ideas.").
61. See, eag., Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politfics, Morality, History, 76
CALIF. L. REV. 779 (1988).
62. Id. at 784, (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs: His BOOK NOTicEs AND UNcoL-
LECFED LETTERS AND PAPERS 201 (H. Shriver ed. 1936)) ('Today, even ardent defenders of
positivism concede that it is a legitimate function not only of the law student and law profes-
sor, but also of the judge and, above all, the legislator, to ask ofa legal rule .... 'Is it just?'.").
Berman then presents the importance of historical jurisprudence in the development of law as
an integration of positivist and naturalist theories as the better approach. He suggests that
positivism is best used during periods of reform, when changing unjust laws could lead to
improved social conditions, and that a natural law theory is more appropriate to revolutionary
situations, where the legitimacy of the laws and the sovereign that made them are being chal-
lenged. Id. at 787-88.
63. See North Sea Cases, supra note 31, at 193 (Tanaka, ., dissenting) ("Natural law does
not venture to interfere with positive law except in the case that positive law rules are mani-
festly immoral and violate the principles of natural law. .. ").
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stitution. Constitutional issues are resolved by invoking an unwritten
Constitution composed of common-law decisions of the courts and acts
of Parliament. The most influential commentators stress natural law as
the basis for that unwritten law. Blackstone, in his famous Commenta-
ries, wrote: "This law of nature being coeval with mankind, and dictated
by God himself, is, of course, superior in obligation to any other. It is
binding over all the globe in all countries, and at all times."
64
Jus cogens is uniquely compatible with the United States' common
law system. This is in part because of the heavy reliance on natural law
principles in the Declaration of Independence 65 and in the Constitu-
tion,66 and in part because American judges have always used customary
international law, including jus cogens principles, even those pre-dating
the American nation.67
Common law courts have the power to curb abuses of fundamental
rights by the government and its officials through writs of habeas corpus,
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. As a further protection of rights,
individuals may bring tort actions against public officials in their private
and official capacities.68
b. The Civil Law System
The civil law system, modeled on ancient Roman law,69 is code-
64. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 27-31 (Lewis ed. 1897).
65. The Declaration of Independence, preamble (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness...
66. U.S. CONsT. amends. I-X, XIV.
67. See L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 24 and accompanying text; U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 153 (1820) (then-existing common law and international law definition of piracy in.
corporated into domestic laws); and The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (rules found,
inter alia, in royal orders of 1403, in treaties of 1521 and in scholarly works from 1661 to be
binding on the United States).
68. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 1983
covers violations of other federal laws in addition to constitutional and civil rights violations);
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (damage remedy may be implied against federal prison
officials for 8th Amendment violations notwithstanding availability of tort remedy); Owens v.
Independence, Missouri, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (municipalities do not have immunity from dam-
age actions for violations of civil rights and constitutional rights laws); Monell v. Dept. of
Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (the Civil Rights Act of 1871
applies to local governments officials and municipalities, but liability may not be based on a
respondeat superior theory); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (damages are recoverable from Fourth Amendment violation
by federal agents even in the absence of a specific statutory remedy). See generally Whitman,
Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. Rav. 5 (1980); Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Federal
Torts Claim Act 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80.
69. The CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS is the codification of Roman law by a succession of legal
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based.7" The law is found in codes and constitutions rather than in judi-
cial precedents. Civil law is positivist in approach. Nonetheless, most
constitutions of contemporary civil law states71 assert such natural law
concepts as "human dignity, ' 72 "rules of morality""3 and "inalienable
human rights."'74 The codes of civil law countries contain principles such
as contra bonos mores (against community standards)7" in the private
law, which imply a common morality and expected norm of conduct.
76
Most civil law countries also have public law remedies which can be
used by citizens alleging, inter alia,jus cogens violations. In Latin Amer-
ican countries, a common remedy is the writ of amparo."n In Mexico, for
example, amparo is used against judges, police, legislators and the execu-
scholars, completed during the reign of Justinian I in 535 A.D. See R. SCHLESINGER, H.
BAADE, M. DAMASKA & P. HERZOG, COMPARATIVE LAW 248 n.e (5th ed. 1988).
70. See generally J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITON (1969); P. SCHLESINGER,
supra note 69.
71. Most European (with the exception of Ireland and the United Kingdom), Latin
American, Asian and African countries that are not former colonies of England use the civil
law system. However, some Asian and North African states are heavily influenced by Muslim
law. Some other African states have legal traditions based on conciliation. These systems rely
heavily on principles analogous to jus cogens. See M'Baye, Le drait africain, ses vices et ses
vertus, REv. SENEGALASE DE DROIT 5 (1970).
72. GRUNIGESETZ [GG] art. I(1) (W. Ger.).
73. Id. art. 11 (1).
74. Id. art. 1(2). See LA CONSTrUTON preamble (France) (natural rights, inalienable
and sacred); CONSTITUCI6N (Spain) (protection of the exercise of human rights). See also
KENP6 (Constitution) preamble (Japan) ("We believe that no nation is responsible to itself
alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is
incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sover-
eign relationship with other nations.").
75. BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] art. 138(1) (W. Ger.) ("A juristic act that is
contra bonos mores is void.") An example of such an act is a usurious contract, i.e., where one
party, acquiring some disproportionate advantage, unfairly exploits the other. See Dawson,
Unconscionable Coersion: the German Version, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1041 (1976). See U.C.C.
§ 2-302 for a similar treatment of unconscionable contracts. In French private law there is no
general provision analogous to the German Civil Code, art. 138. French courts have used a
variety of doctrines to prevent gross unfairness. See THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 824-27, 1024-26
(A. T. von Mehren & J. Gordley eds. 1977).
76. In Germany, 'Yus cogens" is a concept applied in contract law and to the written law
in general as well. R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 70 at 587-88 ("In civilian terminology, a
distinction is drawn between cogent rules (ius cogens), which cannot be abrogated by the par-
ties and render all contrary agreements null and void, and yielding rules (ius dispositivum),
which are subject to the autonomy of the parties in the sense that the parties have the power to
make agreements contrary to the rule.").
77. The writ of amparo provides citizens protection for a wide range of government acts
or laws that violate individual freedoms. It is broader than the writ of habeas corpus, which
requires bodily restraint or imprisonment. Amparo developed in Mexico, where it has consti-
tutional status. See J. MERRYMAN & D. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN
AND LATIN AMERicAN LEGAL SYSTEMs 339-40 (1978).
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tive for illegal or fundamentally unfair acts. 78 Direct amparo may re-
verse the final judgment of a state or federal court; indirect amparo may
enjoin or compel specific actions of police and other non-judicial authori-
ties.79 Amparo contra leyes allows citizen attacks on statutes, decrees, or
regulations.8 0 A similar writ, called mandado de seguranga is used in
Brazil.8 In France and Germany, almost every governmental adminis-
trative act is subject to review by the administrative courts. An act found
to be illegal or an abuse of discretion may be annulled.
8 2
c. The Socialist Law System
Socialist law can be considered a variety of civil law, and hence,
positivist.83 In the socialist law system the state embodies and expresses
the will of its citizens. The will of the people becomes law through the
state. Without state recognition and implementation there are only so-
cial interactions and customs, not law. By definition, the law is that
which the state has accepted as such. It follows that therefore there are
no laws without the existence and participation of the state.
Yet, even the extreme positivism of socialist legal thinking has now
incorporatedjus cogens.84 A question that concern,; jurists is how social-
ist and non-socialist states can have a mutually accepted, binding inter-
national law, given the conflicting ideological bases of the nature of
law.8" The typical response of scholars in the 1940s emphasized treaties
as the only source of binding law between capitalist and socialist coun-
tries.86 This response rejected custom as a source of international law;
78. Clark, Judicial Protection of the Constitution in Latin America, 2 HASTINGS CONST.
L. Q. 405, 419 (1975).
79. Id. at 432.
80. Id. at 432-33. See J. MERRYMAN, supra note 77, at 776-77.
81. Clark, supra note 78, at 419.
82. R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 69, at 501 n.14.
83. See generally J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER, & P. MAGGS, THiE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM
(3d ed. 1977); Shao-Chua, The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China as Reflecting Mao
Tse-Tung's Influence, 68 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 356 (1977).
84. P&eri, The Notion of Positive Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW 1978: SELECTED ESSAYS
FOR THE TENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 66 (I. Szab6 & Z.
P&eri eds. 1978) [hereinafter Pteri, Positive Law] ("[Tihe substance of law cannot be ex-
plained by itself, merely on the basis of state-created laws.").
85. See, eg., Tunkin, supra note 6, at 182-83. (criticizing E. McWhinney's concern as
indicating lack of understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory).
86. Vyshinskii, International Law and International Organization, 1 SOVIET STATE AND
LAW 22 (1948) ("[S]olid international law and order can be assured only on the basis of under-
standing and the recognition of the mutual needs, interests and rights of sovereign states. That
is why the Soviet theory of international law regards the treaty ... as the basic source of
international law. This secures... full moral as well as juridical force, since at their base will
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viewing custom as necessarily a struggle between capitalist and socialist
ideologies. Contemporary Soviet law emphasizes the importance of cus-
tom as a source of international law, and reinforces the compelling qual-
ity ofjus cogens in international rule making.87 It supports the evolution
of one international system of law, influenced by coexisting capitalist and
socialist systems.
88
Socialist legal scholars, however, may interpret the content of jus
cogens differently than capitalist scholars because of the emphasis on eco-
nomic rights in socialist law.89 Socialist goals of social and economic
progress comprise the higher law ofjus cogens. The domestic effect ofjus
cogens is clear:
Marxist social science discovers their relevance in their harmony with
the universal, objective laws of social progress... [E]ven in case of
lack of actual law regulation [these principles] bind the hand of the
legislator and the user of the law in a way, namely, the result of their
activity may not contradict those values, which are expressed in the
basic guiding principles of the socialist society. In such way the basic
principles certainly mean a sort of "upgrading" of the positive law: a
higher level in the system of positive law.90
M. SUBSTANTIVE JUS COGENS
The content ofjus cogens is constantly evolving.91 This is because
lie the obligations agreed to and voluntarily assumed by nations."). See also E. KOROVIN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW DURING THE PRESENT STAGE (1946).
87. See U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, supra note 9, Statement of Mr. Khlestov
(USSR) at 294 (Fus cogens article one of most important) and Statement of Mr. Kudryavtsev
(Byelorussia S.S.R.) id. at 307 ("ample evidence" ofjus cogens norms). Some Soviet scholars
maintain that the U.S.S.R. has played a major role in developing international law. See, eg.,
Blishchenko, International Treaties and Their Application on the Territory of the USSR, 69
AM. J. INT'L L. 819, 827 (1975) ("Because of the nature of the socialist system, the influence of
the socialist legal order on the development of present day international law is always
progressive.").
88. See Tunkin, Forty Years of Coexistence and International Law, 1958 SovIET Y. B.
INT'L L. 15; see also Tunkin, Coexistence and International Law, 95 RECUEiL DES COuRS 419
(1958).
89. Soviet jurists emphasize the freedom from exploitation and colonialism, calling con-
temporary international law "anti-colonial." Tunkin, supra note 6. The right to peace and
self-determination are also imperative in the Soviet view. Id.
90. Piteri, Positive Law, supra note 84, at 68-69.
91. See U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, supra note 9, Statement of Mr. Suarez
(Mexico) at 294 ("There had always been principles ofjus cogens. Although few in number at
the time when inter-state obligations were equally few, they had been increasing since and
would continue to increase with the expansion of human, economic, social and political rela-
tions. The norms ofjus cogens were variable in content and new ones were bound to emerge in
the future.... Others might cease in due course to have the character ofjus cogens, as had
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jus cogens norms reflect the developing interests of the international com-
munity as a whole, not the narrow interests of a particular state.
92
Human rights in particular concern not only states but the whole of civi-
lization. Legal duties are owed by states, not only to their own subjects,
but to the international community as well. 93
Customary international law becomesjus cogens because of the sub-
ject matter: the content ofjus cogens principles make them different from
other rules of international law.94 Jus cogens norms protect humankind
and the existence of the international community in a profound way.95
Certain standards can become jus cogens almost immediately, while
others evolve slowly. For example, Soviet legal authority Tunkin claims
the prohibition of war crimes is an "old norm which [has] acquired the
character ofjus cogens,"96 but the prohibition of crimes against peace is
"relatively new and yet [has] had thejus cogens character from the very
beginning.
'97
The drafters of the Vienna Convention" purposely omitted an
enumeration ofjus cogens rules in the Convention itself because of their
evolving nature. 99 Agreement on existingjus cogens norms is very broad,
happened in Europe in regard to the doctrine of religious unity and the law of the fcudal
system."). See also Nahlik, The Grounds of Invalidity and Termination of Treaties, 65 AM. 3.
INT'L L. 736, 745 (1971) ("The content of... jus cogens is necessarily changeable, like the
content of any group of rules either in international or in domestic law.., enumeration would
have been entirely out of place."); and Paul, supra note 21, at 33 ("[Jus cogens] rules are
constantly in the process of formation. .. ").
92. Verdross, supra note 23, at 58 ("The criterion for these Vus cogens] rules consists In
the fact that they do not exist to satisfy the needs of the individual states but the higher interest
of the whole international community. Hence these rules are absolute.")
93. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C..
3, 32. See also Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23.
94. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st and 2nd Sessions, Official Records, Doc-
uments of the Conference, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/1l/Add. 2 (1971), The International Law
Commission Commentary to the draft article 50 at 67 ("It is not the form of a general rule of
international law but the particular nature of the subject matter with which it deals that may,
in the opinion of the Commission, give it the character ofjus cogens.").
95. See Verdross, supra note 23.
96. Tunkin, Jus Cogens in Contemporary International Law, 1971 U. TOL. L. R V. 107,
117.
97. Id.
98. Vienna Convention, supra note 10.
99. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, supra note 9, at 67-68:
The Commission decided against including any examples of rules ofjus cogens in the
article [draft article 50, later article 53] for two reasons. First, the mention of some
cases of treaties void for conflict with a rule ofjus cogens might, even with the most
careful drafting, lead to misunderstanding as to the position concerning other cases
not mentioned in the article. Secondly, if the Commission were to attempt to draw
up, even on a selective basis, a list of the rules of international law which are to be
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though jurists frequently disagree on norms that are developing. At least
one commentator has expressed concern that enumeration of established
norms in a time-fixed treaty might restrict the evolution of other norms
into jus cogens
1°0
In spite of the reluctance to enumeratejus cogens norms in the Vi-
enna Convention, there is wide agreement on past and currentjus cogens
norms. The oldest recognized jus cogens norms are the prohibition of
piracy,10 1 and slavery.102 International Court of Justice Judge Manfred
Lachs, citing early writers, posits that jus cogens as a principle of law
evolved to address the special gravity of piracy and slavery." 3
English authority Ian Brownlie, stressing the indelibility of jus
cogens rules, lists these examples ofjus cogens: "the prohibition of ag-
gressive war, the law of genocide, the principle of racial non-discrimina-
tion, crimes against humanity, and the rules prohibiting trade in slaves
and piracy."" Most authorities agree with former International Court
of Justice Judge Fitzmaurice's enumeration ofjus cogens norms: recogni-
tion of the rule against the use of force and non-recognition of situations
brought about by the use of force; the rule that treaties imposed by force
are void; rules prohibiting crimes against peace and humanity, including
genocide, near-genocide, and acts in the nature of genocide; the rule that
a plea of superior orders is prima facie no answer to a charge of crime
against peace and humanity or of a war crime; the principle of the non-
derogability ofjus cogens rules; policies and actions of a state having neg-
ative consequences to the international community; and the duty to help
other countries for the general welfare of themselves and the interna-
tional community as a whole. 105
regarded as having the character ofjus cogens, it might find itself engaged in a pro-
longed study of matters which fall outside the scope of the present articles.
100. Paul, supra note 21, at 33 ('[E]numerat[ion] [ofjus cogens norms]... would restrict
the possibilities of their future development.").
101. L. OPPENiHiM, supra note 24, at 528; See A. McNAm, THE LAW OF TRaATis 215
(1961). In United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820), Justice Story utilizes
the standard customary law test to determine that piracy violates the law of nations. He also
uses jus cogens language. ("There is scarcely a writer on the law of nations, who does not
allude to piracy as a crime of a settled and determinate nature... [piracy is] an offence against
the universal law of society, a pirate being deemed an enemy of the human race.").
102. Report of the ILC to the General Assembly, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at I, U.N.
Doc. AICN.4/Ser. A/1963/Add.1. (Prohibition against slavery "one of the most obvious and
best settled rules ofjus cogens."). See also L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 24, at 528.
103. Lachs, The Law of Treatier Some General Reflections on the Report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission, in RECUEIL D'ETUDES DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL, EN HO.MMAGE A
PAUL GUcGENHEiM 391, 399 (1968).
104. I. Browniie, supra note 12, at 513.
105. Fitzmaurice, supra note 6, at 323. Fitzmaurice's call to the duty to help other coun-
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Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told the Organization of
American States that "there are standards below which no government
can fall without offending fundamental values, such as genocide, officially
tolerated torture, mass imprisonment or murder, or the comprehensive
denial of basic rights to racial, religious, political, or ethnic groups. Any
government engaging in such practices must face adverse international
judgment."10' 6 The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States lists six prohibitions affecting human rights asjus cogens: a) geno-
cide, b) slavery or slave trade, c) the murder or causing the disappear-
ance of individuals, d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment, e) prolonged arbitrary detention, and f) sys-
tematic racial discrimination.10 7 In addition, the Restatement accepts
that a rule of jus cogens will void a conflicting treaty, 10 8 and that "the
principles of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force
(Comment h) have the character ofjus cogens."' 0 '
A. Prohibition of Genocide as Jus Cogens
Genocide is universally recognized as violatingjus cogens:110 geno-
cide is a crime against humanity.11 At its first session the United Na-
tions General Assembly declared genocide a crime against international
law. 12 Genocide "shocks the conscience.... [Its prohibition is a princi-
ple] recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without a
conventional [treaty-based] obligation." '113 Its prohibition imposes erga
tries arises from the U.N. Charter, art. 1.3. Other major scholars set out similar lists. See, e.g.,
A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 175, 179 (1986) (prohibition of the
use or threat of force, genocide, slavery, self-determination, racial discrimination); Whiteman,
Jus Cogens in International Law, With a Projected List, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 609, 625-26
(1977) (genocide, slavery, piracy, terrorism, threat of force (intervention), aggression, recogni-
tion of fruits of war crimes, mass destruction, upsetting world food supply).
106. 75 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. No. 1932 (1976) 1, at 3.
107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT] ("Not all human rights norms are peremptory norms (jus cogens), but those in
clauses (a) to (f) of this section are, and an international agreement that violates them is
void.") "d. comment n. See also, id. § 702 comment m regarding consistent patterns of gross
violations of human rights.
108. Id. § 702 comment n.
109. Id. § 102, comment k; see id. comment h.
110. For a definition of genocide, see Genocide Convention, supra note 4.
111. The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, in force Nov. 11, 1970, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, reprinted In 8 I.L.M.
68 (1969) [hereinafter War Crimes Convention].
112. G.A. Res. 96 (1), Dec. 11, 1946.
113. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23.
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omnes obligations on states.1 14 The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights declares that genocide "achieves the status ofjus cogens
precisely because it is the kind of rule that it would shock the conscience
of mankind... for a State to protest.
11 5
While genocide clearly violatesjus cogens, there has been little judi-
cial guidance on what actg constitute genocide. One key issue is the re-
moval of indigenous peoples from their lands or the destruction of their
lands. In the United States, for instance, these acts cause physical and
cultural annihilation because land is an integral part of American Indian
religion and cultural cohesiveness.
1 1 6
B. The Right to Life as Jus Cogens
The right to life, called the most fundamental human right, is ajus
cogens rule.117 The right to life is positioned prominently in virtually
every major international human rights instrument."' As one scholar
states, "[T]he right to life... is one of the rights universally recognized
as forming part ofjus cogens and entailing, on the part of States, obliga-
tions erga omnes toward the international community as a whole."
119
In spite of itsjus cogens character, there are exceptions to the right
to life. For example, states have the right to maintain armies and to
order soldiers into combat. Incidental civilian casualties are not neces-
sarily violations, though casualties resulting from violations of the rules
of war do violate the right to life. 20 Additionally, national constitutions
114. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Berig. v. Spain), 1970 I.CJ.
3, 32 (" E]rga omnes... obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law,
from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules
concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial
discrimination.").
115. Roach Death Penalty Case, supra note 31, at 169.
116. See Genocide Convention, supra note, 4 art. II; INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR
JUSTICE 118 (1987) (Genocide Convention applicable to indigenous peoples). See also THE
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS ON SELF-
DETERMINATION (R. Thompson ed. 1986); R. DUNBAR, INDIANS OF THE AMERICAS:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION (1984).
117. See Gormley, supra note 5.
118. See, ag., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 3, art. 3 ("Everyone has
the right to life, liberty and the security of the person."); the International Covenant on Civil &
Political Rights, supra note 40, art. 6(1) ("Every human being has the inherent right to life.
This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.").
119. A.V. Ribero, Report on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of
All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1987/35 (1987).
120. Case 9213, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 184, OEA/ser. L/V/II.74, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987) (Coin-
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and international instruments allow the death penalty. 12 But use of the
death penalty has been subject to strictest scrutiny in international fo-
rums. In a recent case the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights found that the United States Government violated the right to life
in imposing the death penalty on two juveniles.1 22 The Commission
found juvenile execution proscribed by a regional norm ofjus cogens.
1 23
Other aspects of the right to life have also been scrutinized. For
example, legal abortions have been found not to violate the right to
life. 24 Summary or arbitrary deprivations of life, addressed regularly by
the United Nations, are clearly prohibited.1 25 Some legal experts suggest
that the right to life incorporates the right to peace,126 the right to a safe
environment 27 and the right to living.
128
C. Humanitarian Law as Jus Cogens
Humanitarian law governs the conduct of armed conflict and the
protection of victims of armed conflict. The primary sources of humani-
tarian law are: 1) the Geneva Conventions1 29 and Protocols Addi-
tional; 30 2) the Hague Convention of 1907;131 3) United Nations
mission found prima facie violation of right to life in respondent government's bombing of
hospital in Grenada).
121. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 40, art. 6.
122. Roach Death Penalty Case, supra note 31. The United States is bound by the OAS
Declaration. Case 2141, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 25, OEA/ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9 rev, 1 (1981).
The American Declaration does not mention capital punishment per se; it states: "Every
human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his person." American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, supra note 17 at art. 4(5), specifically prohibits capital punishment for
minors under the age of 18, but the United States is not a party to the Convention.
123. Roach Death Penalty Case, supra note 31.
124. See, e.g., Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, OEA Ser. L/V/21.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981).
125. See, e.g., S. Wako, Report on Summary or Arbitrary Execution, U.N. Doc. E/CN4/
1986/21 (1986); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/20 (1987); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/22 and Add. 1
& 2 (1988); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/25 (1989).
126. Dawes, The Right to Peace, 60 AUSTL. L. J. 156 (1986); see, e.g., Ramcharan, The
Concept and Dimensions of the Right to Life, in THE RIGHT TO LIm, IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
10 (Ramcharan ed. 1985).
127. Ramcharan, supra note 126, at 13.
128. Gormley, supra note 5, at 136, 145-46. Gormley incorporates the subsistence rights of
shelter, food, health care and social security-the major economic rights-into the right to life.
See also INTER-AM. C.H.R. 152 OEA/Ser. L/V/l 1.50, doc 13 rev. 1 (1980): "the priority of
the 'rights of survival' and 'basic needs' is a natural consequence of the right to personal
security."
129. Geneva Conventions, supra note 4.
130. Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Convention of 1978, in force Dec.7, 1978, U.N.
Doc. A/32/144/Annex 1 (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol Ad-
ditional I]; Protocol Additional II to the Geneva Convention of 1949, in force Dec. 7, 1978,
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resolutions;132 and 4) rules of customary international law, which include
principals of the law of civilized nations, principles of humanity and the
dictates of public conscience.
1 33
The codification of natural law concepts relating to warfare began in
1864. The Geneva Convention of 1864 provided protection for sick and
wounded combatants including medical personnel who treated them, and
enemy wounded.1 34 The Hague Convention of 1907 established rules
governing the conduct of armed conflict.' 35  The concepts of crimes
against humanity and war crimes (crimes against enemy combatants or
civilians) developed further when the peace treaty concluding World
War I (the Treaty of Versailles) imposed individual responsibility on the
Emperor and war criminals.136
At the end of World War II, in response to the Holocaust, interna-
tional criminal law was further codified by the Charter of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal which created an ad hoc international court.137
The Nuremberg Charter recognizes international peremptory norms that
U.N. Doe. A/32/144/Annex H (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Proto-
col Additional II].
131. Hague Convention, supra note 4.
132. See, eg., Resolution on Basic Principles of Protection for Civilian Populations in
Time of Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 2675,25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 76, U.N. Doe. A/
8028 (1971); G.A. Res. 40/139, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53), U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985);
G.A. Res. 41/35, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 26, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986).
133. Hague Convention, supra note 4, 8th preamb. para.; Geneva Conventions, supra note
4: (armed forces in the field) art. 63; (armed forces at sea) art. 62; (prisoners of war) art. 142;
(civilians) art. 158. The Supreme Court stated: "From the very beginning if its history this
Court has recognized and applied the law of war as... part of the law of nations." Ex Parte
Quirin 317 U.S. I at 10 (1942). The Court also cites the 8th preambular paragraph (known as
the Marten's Clause) of the Hague Convention of 1907. Id. at 14.
134. The Geneva Convention of 1864 was instigated by Jean Henry Dunant, a Swiss phi-
lanthropist, who organized the Red Cross following his experiences at the Battle of Solferino.
The Geneva Convention was revised in 1906, and supplemented and revised again in 1929 and
1937 in response to the changing conditions of warfare in World War I. Following World War
II, the Geneva Conventions were promulgated as four separate treaties. Geneva Conventions
supra note 4. Following the decolonization process in Africa, and the United States involve-
ment in Vietnam, the Geneva Conventions were again expanded. Protocols Additional I (in-
ternational armed conflicts) and II (civil wars), supra note 130.
135. Hague Convention, supra note 4.
136. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 11 Martens R. Nouveau Recueil (Ser. 3) 323, 2
Bevans 43. The Covenant of the League of Nations constituted Part I of the Treaty of
Versailles.
137. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, in force August 8, 1945, 59 Star. 1544,
E.A.S No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in 3 Bevans 1238 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
The United States, Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. created this tribunal to sit at Nuremberg,
Germany, and try Nazi officers for war crimes from November, 1945 to October, 1946. A
similar tribunal was established in Tokyo by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East, which tried and sentenced Japanese war criminals from 1946 to 1947. Dated
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neither states nor individuals may abrogate. War crimes and crimes
against humanity for which individuals are held personally responsible
are acts that violate these universal standards, and include:
[M]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhu-
mane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during
the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in exe-
cution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal [i.e., either crimes against peace or war crimes], whether or
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
138
The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations
to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity139 also identifies grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 194914 as war crimes. 141 Thejus
cogens character of these crimes is reinforced by the acknowledgment
that they "are among the gravest of crimes in international law.' '1 42
Most scholars acknowledge international consensus that humanitarian
law as a whole is jus cogens,1 43 though there is some merit to the view
that breaches such as improper withholding of writing material to a pris-
oner of war be considered a mere infraction, and not a war crime.144
The International Court of Justice recognized thejus cogens status
of common articles one and three of the Geneva Conventions1 45 in the
case Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua.146
Jan. 19, 1946 as amended Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. 1589, 4 Bevans 20. See STONE, LEOAL
CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONnLIar 312, n.82 (1954).
138. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 137; 3 Bevans at 1242.
139. War Crimes Convention, supra note 111, art. I(b).
140. Geneva Conventions, supra note 4. The grave breach articles are: (armed forces In
the field) art. 50; (armed forces at sea) art. 51; (prisoners of war) art. 130; (civilians) art. 147.
141. War Crimes Convention, supra note 111, art. l(a).
142. Id. 4th preamb. para.
143. Alexidze, Legal Nature of Jus Cogens In Contemporary International Law 172
RECUEIL DES CouRs 223, 262-63 (1982) (peremptory character of Geneva Conventions "obvi-
ous"); Verdross, supra note 23, at 55, 59; Whiteman, supra note 105, at 626; J. PicrT, PAIN-
CIPLES OF HUMANrrARIAN LAW 26 (1966) ("[humanitarian law] presents the rudiments of
humanity; a minimum applicable at all times, in all places and circumstances... [alithough
based on written law, they are part of the customs of peoples from which none may disengage
himself.").
144. See, e.g., Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Rule of Law, Consid.
ered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 HAGUE RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 125 (1957).
145. "Common articles" means that these articles appear in each of the four Geneva Con-
ventions. Common article 1 states: The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and
ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances (emphasis added). Common
article 3 contains basic provisions applicable during civil wars.
146. Nicar v. U.S. Case, supra note I at 100-01, 113-15 (opinion of the Court), 151-53
(Singh, J., separate opinion), 199-200 (Sette-Camara, J., separate opinion).
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The Court declared that common articles one and three "constitute a
minimum yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate rules which are
also to apply to international conflicts; and they are rules which...
reflect what the Court in 1949 called 'elementary considerations of hu-
manity' [in the Corfu Channel case]." 147 The Court held:
[T]here is an obligation on the United States Government, in the term
of Art. 1 of the Geneva Conventions, to 'respect' the Conventions and
even 'to ensure respect' for them 'in all circumstances', since such an
obligation does not derive only from the Conventions themselves, but
from the general principles of humanitarian law to which the Conven-
tions merely give specific expression.
1 48
This aspect of international responsibility for compliance with humanita-
rian law and the Geneva Conventions, even if a state is not a signatory to
them, or a party to the conflict, reinforces theirjus cogens status.
D. Non-refoulement as Jus Cogens
Closely related to the right to life and principles of humanitarian
law is the right of non-refoulement.1 9 Many persons who have fled their
country of origin today have done so because of war, civil strife, gross
violations of human rights, and natural disasters such as drought, famine
and earthquake. Some are denied asylum rights under refugee criteria.t 5°
Return to their home country would place their right to life and security
of person and other fundamental human rights at substantial risk. In
these circumstances, the international principle of non-refoulement ap-
147. Id at 114.
148. Id.
149. The principle of non-refoulement, from the French refouler (to return), provides that a
person has a right to not be returned to the country of origin under certain circumstances.
While often arising because of persecution, and therefore governed by non-refoulement sec-
tions in refugee treaties, the right also exists when a person has suffered, inter alia, the dangers
of war or gross violations of human rights. See, ag., Report of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 6, U.N. Doe. A/40/12 (1985) ("The principle
[of non-refoulement] requires that no person shall be subject to such measures as rejection at
the frontier... or compulsory return to any country where he may have reason to fear...
serious danger resulting from unsettled conditions or civil strife.'). See also Goodwin-Gill,
Non-refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 897 (1986); Parker, Geneva
Convention Protection of Salvadoran Refugees, 13 IMM. NEWS 1 (1984); Parker, Human Rights
and Humanitarian Law, 7 WHrrnER L. REV. 675 (1985).
150. Refugee law provides for asylum for a person who is unable or unwilling to return to
his or her former country of origin or residence "because of persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion .... 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A), implementing the Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees, supra note 4. See also, Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, in force Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
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plies. The principle of non-refoulement, usually referred to only in its
refugee law application,1 51 is also part of human rights law152 and hu-
manitarian law, 153 and is acknowledged as ajus cogens norm.1 4 Thejus
cogens nature of the right of non-refoulement is especially apparent be-
cause the later doctrine imposes obligations on states not involved in the
acts that lead to the ffight of the victim. Respect for the right of non-
refoulement asjus cogens under humanitarian law is especially imperative
because a wartime violation is a grave breach.1 55 Grave breaches are war
crimes. 56 However, in all its applications, the right of non-refoulement,
like alljus cogens norms, exists outside of treaties, and is non-derogable,
binding and judicially enforceable.
E. The Prohibition Against the Use of Force as .us Cogens
The most recent pronouncement on the substantive content of jus
cogens by the International Court of Justice has been the condemnation
of the use or threat of force by one country against another as a violation
ofjus cogens. In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nica-
ragua,157 the Court made clear that the international rule prohibiting the
use of force as expressed in article two, paragraph four of the United
151. See, e.g., Refugee Convention, supra note 150, art. 33.
152. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, in force June 26, 1987, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984) [hereinafter
Torture Convention]. Article 3 provides: "1. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or
extradite a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 2. For the purpose of determining whether
there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant consider-
ations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern
of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights" (emphasis added).
153. Hague Convention, supra note 4, 8th preamb. para. (civilians protected by principles
of humanity and "dictates of public conscience"); Geneva Conventions, supra note 4 (civil-
ians), art. 45.
154. Report of U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at
6, U.N. Doc. A/40/12 (1985) ("Due to its repeated reaffirmation at the universal, regional and
national levels, the principle of non-refoulement has now come to be characterized as a per-
emptory norm of international law."); INTER-AM. C.H.R. 132-35, OEA/ser. L/V/ll.57, doe. 6
rev. 1 (1982); Cartegena Declaration on Refugees (Geneva, United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees 1984), conclusion 3 ("[Refugees include] persoas who have fled their coun-
try because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign
aggression, internal conflict, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which
have seriously disturbed public order") and conclusion 5 ("[Non-refoulement] is imperative in
regard to refugees... as a rule ofjus cogens.").
155. Geneva Conventions supra note 4 (civilians), art. 147.
156. War Crimes Convention, supra note 111, art. I (a).
157. Nicear. v. U.S. Case, supra note 1.
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Nations Charter"' is ajus cogens standard, admitting no conduct in con-
travention to it.'59 The Court stated:
A further confirmation of the validity as customary international law
of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force... may be found
in the fact that it is frequently referred to in statements by State repre-
sentatives as being not only a principle of customary international law
but also a fundamental or cardinal principle of such law. The Interna-
tional Law Commission, in the course of its work on the codification of
the law of treaties, expressed the view that "the law of the Charter
concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a
conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the charac-
ter ofjus cogens".
16
The Court then noted that both Nicaragua and the United States had
referred to the prohibition of the use of force asjus cogens.
161
In his separate opinion, Judge Nagendra Singh emphasized that
"the principle of non-use of force belongs to the realm ofjus cogens, and
is the very cornerstone of the human effort to promote peace in a world
torn by strife."' 62 Judge Sette-Camara, in his separate opinion, stated he
firmly believe[s] that the non-use of force as well as non-intervention-
the latter as a corollary of equality of States and self-determination-
are not only cardinal principles of customary international law, but
could in addition be recognized as peremptory rules of customary in-
ternational law which impose obligations on all States.
163
F. Prohibition of Torture as Jus Cogens
Torture is widely recognized as contraveningjus cogens."' All ma-
jor human rights agreements and instruments contain a prohibition
against torture. 65 In the relevant treaties, the prohibition is non-dero-
158. This section provides: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
159. Nicar. v. U.S. Case, supra note 1 , at 100-01. See 1984 I.CJ. 392, 614-15 (Schwebe, 3.,
dissenting).
160. Nicar. v. U.S. Case, supra note 1, at 100-01.
161. Id.
162. Id at 153 (Singh, 3., separate opinion).
163. Id. at 199 (Sette-Camara, J., separate opinion).
164. Higgins, Derogation Under Human Rights Treaties, 1976-77 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L 281-
82 ("There certainly exists a consensus that certain rights-the right to life, to freedom from
slavery or torture-are so fundamental that no derogation may be made.").
165. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 3, art. 5; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 40, art. 7; American Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 17, art. 5; European Convention For the Protection of Human Rights and
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gable.166 Torture in time of war is a grave breach of humanitarian
law. 167
To reinforce the prohibitions against torture, the United Nations
General Assembly promulgated the Torture Convention. 168 Because of
the universal concern about the widespread occurrence of torture, the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights appointed a special rap-
porteur on torture, Peter Kooijmans, to "promote the full implementa-
tion of the prohibition under international and national law of the
practice of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment." 169 In Mr. Kooijmans' 1986 report, he emphasized thejus
cogens nature of the prohibition against torture:
Torture is now absolutely and without any reservation prohibited
under international law whether in time of peace or of war. In all
human rights instruments the prohibition of torture belongs to the
group of rights from which no derogation can be made. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice has qualified the obligation to respect the basic
human rights, to which the right not to be tortured belongs beyond
any doubt, as obligations erga omnes... which every State has a legal
interest [to implement]. The International Law Commission ... has
labelled serious violations of these basic human rights as 'international
crimes,' giving rise to the specific responsibility of the States con-
cerned. In view of these qualifications the prohibition of torture can be
considered to belong to the rules ofjus cogens. If ever a phenomenon
Fundamental Freedoms, in force Sept. 3, 1953, Europ. T.S. No. 5, art. 3; the African (Banjul)
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG67/3 rev. 5, reprinted In 21
I.L.M. 58, (1982) art. 5; Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 6 (1956) at 67 [hereinafter Standard Minimum Rules]; Declaration of the Rights of
the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354
(1960), principle 9; Code of Conduct of the United Nations for Law Enforcement Officials,
G.A. Res. 34/169, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 185, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980), art, 5;
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in force
Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966) art. 5; and Principles of
Medical Ethics, G.A. Res. 3/194, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 510, U.N. Doc, A/37/51
(1983), principle 2.
166. See, eg., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 40, art. 4.
167. Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, (armed forces in the field), art. 50; (armed forces at
sea), art. 51; (prisoners of war), art. 130; (civilians), art. 147.
168. Torture Convention, supra note 152. Paragraph 5 emphasizes the Assembly's inten-
tion to achieve "a more effective implementation of the existing prohibition under international
and national law of the practice of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment" Id. at 197 (emphasis added). G.A. Res. 39/118, passed Dec. 14, 1984, again
included the reference to "the existing prohibition under international law of every form of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," making it clear that the Assembly
recognized an existing customary law standard independent of the resolutions.
169. Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1985/33, 1985 U.N. ESCOR, supp. (No. 2) at
71, U.N. Doc. E/1985/22.
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was outlawed unreservedly and unequivocally it is torture.
170
G. The Prohibition of Apartheid as Jus Cogens
Apartheid, the system of institutionalized racial segregation and dis-
crimination, began evolving as a crime againstjus cogens virtually since
its introduction into South Africa in 1948.171 Prior to the introduction of
apartheid, the treatment of South Africans of South Asian ancestry was
one of the first human rights issues addressed by the United Nations
General Assembly. 172 The United Nations has regularly condemned
apartheid as a grave threat to world order, peace and security, 173 under-
scoring the understanding that violations ofjus cogens norms in and of
themselves upset world order and the operation of international law.
The United Nations Security Council has adopted numerous resolutions
to isolate and put pressure on the racist regime of South Africa to con-
form to international standards because of the South African govern-
ment's egregious violations of international law.174 The General
Assembly indicated that the apartheid regime in South Africa "has few
parallels in history for its inhumanity."
171
There is widespread acceptance that apartheid is a crime against hu-
manity176 To emphasize its repugnance of apartheid and to provide re-
lief to the system's victims, the United Nations promulgated the
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid.17 7 This convention reinforces the international com-
170. U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1986/15 at 1. Kooijmans made similar mention in his 1987 re-
port. U.N. E/CN.4/1987/13 at 13-15.
171. For a summary of United Nations action against apartheid from 1948 through 1982,
see U.N., UNITED NATIONs ACTION IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 59-80, U.N. Doc. ST/
HR/2/Rev. 2, U.N. Sales No. E.83.XIV.2 (1983).
172. See Treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa, G.A. Res. 44 (I), U.N. Doe.
A/64/Add. 1 at 69 (1947).
173. See, eg., G.A. Res. 721 (VIII), 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 6-7, U.N. Doe. A/
2630 (1953).
174. For a list of Security Council resolutions from 1963-1986, see U.N. Doc. A/AC.115/
2/SER.A/1987 Spec. Issue.
175. G.A. Res. 31/6, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 16, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976).
176. See, eg., War Crimes Convention, supra note 111, art. l(b); G.A. Res. 41/35,41 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 26, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1987); G.A.Res. 40/64,40 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 53) at 32, U.N. Doe. A/40/53 (1986); UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial
Prejudice, adopted Nov. 27, 1978, art. 4 ("apartheid, ... is a crime against humanity, and
gravely disturbs international peace and security.").
177. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, in force July 18, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 245, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 507 (1974) [herein-
after Apartheid Convention].
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munity's recognition that apartheid is crime against humanity,17 8 and
that certain attributes of apartheid constitute genocide.
17 9
H. Self-Determination as Jus Cogens
The right to self-determination, the collective right of a people'8 0 to
freely determine their own political status and to pursue economic, social
and cultural development, is ajus cogens norm. The right to self-deter-
mination is the first right set out in the two major international human
rights treaties."' In the definitive work on the right of self-determina-
tion, United Nations special rapporteur Hector Gros Espiell repeatedly
emphasizes thejus cogens nature of this right.8 2 Originally applied in a
political context to colonized peoples, 8 3 the right to economic self-deter-
mination has become equally important. 8 4 Political independence must
be coupled with permanent sovereignty over natural resources to truly
realize self-determination.1 5 Cultural rights, such as habitat, language,
religion, and traditions, are also recognized in thisjus cogens norm.
18 6
178. Id., art. I and 6th and 7th preamb. paras.
179. Id., 5th preamb. para., citing Genocide Convention, supra note 4.
180. Modem international law attributes the right to peoples, as opposed to states, See the
Western Sahara Case, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31 "the principle of sell'determination as a right of
peoples. .. ." Special rapporteur Gros Espiell elaborated this point: "Self-determination is a
right of peoples... of a specific type of human community sharing a common desire to estab.
lish an entity capable of functioning to ensure a common future." H. Gros Espiell, Report on
the Right of Self-Determination, E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/rev.l (1980) at 9. The right to self-deter-
mination may also be considered an individual right. Id at 10.
181. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in force Jan. 3,
1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) art. 1; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, supra note 40 art. 1.
182. H. Gros Espiell, supra note 180, at 11-13. "[N]o one can challenge the fact that, in
the light of contemporary international realities, the principle of self-determination necessarily
possesses the character ofjus cogens." Id. at 12. Gros Espiell also indicates numerous in-
stances in United Nations human rights bodies where mention is made of thejus cogens nature
of self-determination. Id. at 11-13.
183. See, ag., Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doe. A/4684
(1961); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res,
2625 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doe. A/8028 (1971).
184. H. Gros Espiell, supra note 180, at 26.
185. See Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Naturad Resources, G.A, Res. 1803
(XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. DOC. A/5215 (1963) and G.A. Res. 3171
(XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 36) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974); Declaration on
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, GA. Res. 3201, 6 special sess,
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A19559 (1974).
186. H. Gros Espiell, supra note 180, at 28; see Draft Declaration of Principles on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1985/WP.5 and Add.4:
Indigenous nations and peoples continue to own and control their material culture,
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In the case Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Afica in Namibia (S. W. Africa) notwithstanding Security Coun-
cil Resolution 276, Judge Ammoun called the right of self-determination
a "norm of the nature ofjus cogens, derogation from which is not permis-
sible under any circumstances." '187 A consequence of the denial of the
right to self-determination is wars of national liberation. In 1970, Judge
Ammoun recognized the lawfulness of armed struggle to achieve the
right to self-determination."' 8 Subsequently, Protocol Additional I to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949189 was promulgated, which sanctions:
armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domina-
tion and alien occupation and against racist regimes in exercise of their
right of self-determination as enshrined in the Charter of the United
Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accord-
ance with the Charter of the United Nations.
19
Ian Brownlie reinforces this interpretation of Protocol Additional I in
noting that the jus cogens nature of the right to self-determination re-
quires recognition of a special combatant status for armed defenders of
the right to self-determination. 9
I. The Whole of Human Rights as Jus Cogens
The International Court of Justice Judge Tanaka has forcibly made
the case for the whole of human rights law beingjus cogens:
If we can introduce in the international field a category of law, namely
including archaeological, historical, and sacred sites, artifacts, designs, knowledge,
and works of art. They have the right to retain items of major cultural significance
and, in all cases, to the return of the human remains of their ancestors for burial in
accordance with their tradition... [they] have the right to be educated and conduct
business with states in their own language, and to establish their own educational
situations.
See also supra note 116 and accompanying text (cultural genocide).
187. 1971 I.CJ. 16, 89-90 (Ammoun, J., separate opinion). The Court analyzed the princi-
ple of self-determination in the Western Sahara Case, 1975 I.CJ. at 31-33. See Cassese, Self-
Determination of Peoples, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (Henkin, ed. 1981) CAs has been
conclusively demonstrated elsewhere, the general principle of self-determination has become a
peremptory norm of international law (ius cogens).").
188. 1970 LCJ. 3, 304, (Ammoun, J., separate opinion), quoting former Secretary-General
of the United Nations U Thant in support of this point.
189. Protocol Additional I, supra note 130.
190. Id. art. 1.
191. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 12, at 83 ("[O]ne aspect ofjus cogens, the principle of self-
determination, may justify the granting of a higher status to certain types of belligerent entities
and exile governments than would otherwise be the case.").
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jus cogens, recently examined by the International Law Commission, a
kind of imperative law which constitutes the contrast to thejus disposi-
tivum ... surely the law concerning the protection of human rights
may be considered to belong to thejus cogens. As an interpretation of
Article 38, paragraph 1 (c) [Statute of the ICJ], we consider that the
concept of human rights and of their protection is included in the gen-
eral principles mentioned in the Article [as a source of international
law]."
' 192
International Court of Justice Judge Ammoun called the protection
of human fights "an obligatory legal norm,"1 13 and insisted that human
fights principles appearing in the preamble of the United Nations Char-
ter arejus cogens.194 Scholar Louis Sohn agrees, writing that the Char-
ter's basic human rights provisions constitute jus cogens.195  The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 96 is the authoritative interpre-
tation of human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter. 197 The
Universal Declaration as a whole is itself customary international law,
198
and is rapidly establishing itself as jus cogens.1 99
Not all commentators agree that the whole of human rights law
presently constitutes imperative rules ofjus cogens.200 However, scholars
192. The South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. S. Ar.; Liberia v. S. Afr.) 1966 I.CJ. 6,298
(Tanaka, J., dissenting).
193. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 at 301.
194. Id. at 304. The preamble states, in pertinent part: "We the Peoples of the United
Nations, determined... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person... and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for
the obligations arising from ... international law can be maintained ... have resolved to
combine our efforts and accomplish these aims." U.N. CHARTER, preamble. See H. Gros
Espiell, supra note 180, at 12 ("[E]ven if it is accepted that the De.claration... is heterogene-
ous, and thus not of the nature ofjus cogens in every one of its propositions, the fundamental
principles of the Charter embodied in it... are nevertheless of the nature ofjus cogens.").
195. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather
Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1982).
196. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 3.
197. PROCLAMATION OF TEHERAN, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41, U.N. Sales No. E.68XIV
2 (1968), endorsed in G.A. Res. 2442 (XXIII), 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 49, U.N.
Doc. A/7218 (1969); see Sohn, supra note 195, at 16.
198. See Nayar, Introduction to Human Rights: the United Nations and United States For-
eign Policy, 19 HARV. INT'L L. J. 813, 816-17 (1978). See generally, E. SCHWELI, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: THE ROOTS AND GROWTH OF THE UNI-
VERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 1948-1963 (1964).
199. M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 345 (1980).
200. Higgins, supra note 164, at 282 ("[C]ertain rights ... are so fundamental that no
derogation can be made. And international human rights treaties undoubtedly contain ele-
ments that are binding as principles which are recognized ... not only as mutual treaty com-
mitments... [but this does not lead] to the view that all human rights arejus cogens."). See T.
MERON, supra note 40, 58-60 (derogable human rights in treaties are not jus cogens),
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stress that the implementation of human rights is an international obliga-
tion, and that international human rights instruments are acquiringjus
cogens status and becoming a "global bill of rights." °1
IV. PROCEDURAL EFFECTS OF JUS COGENS
A. Jus Cogens and Treaties
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties" 2 codifies the cus-
tomary international law rules relating to treaties. Article 53 sets out the
international law ofjus cogens as it relates to treaties:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is
a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general interna-
tional law having the same character.20
3
Article 64 of the Vienna Convention addresses the effect of a newjus
cogens norm on a preexisting treaty.' 4 Article 64 states: "If a new per-
emptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty
which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates." 20 5
Articles 69 through 72 set out the consequences of invalid, terminated or
201. M. McDOUGAL, supra note 199, at 185. The authors conclude "that the great bulk of
the contemporary human rights prescriptions [are] clearly identifiable asjus cogens." Id. at
345.
202. Vienna Convention, supra note 10.
203. Id. art. 53.
204. Id. art. 64. Article 71 states:
1. In the case of a treaty which is void under article 53 the parties shall:
(a) eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act performed in reli-
ance on any provision which conflicts with the peremptory norm of general in-
ternational law; and
(b) bring their mutual relations into conformity with the peremptory norm of
general international law.
2. In the case of a treaty which becomes void and terminates under article 64, the
termination of the treaty:
(a) releases the parties from any obligation further to perform the treaty;
(b) does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created
through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination; provided that those
rights, obligations or situations may thereafter be maintained only to the extent
that their maintenance is not in itself in conflict with the new peremptory norm
of general international law.
205. Id. art. 64.
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suspended treaties.2 °6 The parties may submit ar application for inter-
pretation ofjus cogens under articles 53 and 64 to the International Court
of Justice.2"7
Countries which are not signatories to the Vienna Convention, such
as the United States, are nonetheless bound by itsjus cogens provisions as
a matter of customary international law, because the binding, non-dero-
gable nature of jus cogens rules has long been accepted as part of the
customary law of treaties.20 8 The Restatement accepts the Vienna Con-
vention rules relating tojus cogens. 209 Professor Nahlik of the University
of Cracow acknowledges the contemporary consensus:
Even though it may appear new to supporters of traditional doctrines,
the provision of the Vienna Convention declaring void treaties which
are contrary to a norm of internationaljus cogens is not an invention of
either the International Law Commission or the Vienna Conference.
It reflects a state of affairs which was slowly coming into being at a
much earlier date and which, with the entry into force of the United
Nations Charter, is no longer subject to any doubt."4
210
206. Id. art. 69-72. Article 71 specifically addresses treaties void because ofjus cogens,
requiring parties to, inter alia, bring their conduct into conformity with thejus cogens norm.
207. Id. art. 66.
208. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 24, at 897 ("It is a unanimously recognized customary rule
of International Law that obligations which are at variance with universally recognized princi-
ples of International Law cannot be the object of a treaty. If, for instance, a State entered into
a convention with another State not to interfere in case the latter should appropriate a certain
part of the Open Sea, or should command its vessels to commit piratical acts on the Open Sea,
such treaty would be null and void, because it is a principle of International Law that no part
of the Open Sea can be appropriated, and that it is the duty of every State to interdict to Its
vessels the commission of piracy on the High Seas."); W. HALL, TREATIsE ON INTIRNA-
TIONAL LAw 319 (7th ed. 1917) ("A treaty becomes [void] ... [b]y incompatibility with the
general obligations of states, when a change has taken place in undisputed law or in views
universally held with respect to morals."); see also Verdross, Forbidden Treaties In Interna-
tional Law, 31 AM. . INT'L L. 571 (1937); Elias, Problems Concerning the Validity of Treaties,
134 RECUEIL DES CouRs 388 (1971); A. D'AMATO, supra note 7 at 96 ("Even international
rules ofjus cogens, or peremptory norms, are.., simply rules that deny the validity of certain
substantive provisions that might be included in treaties."). This point was emphatically
stressed at the Lagonissi Conference on the Concept of Jus Cogens in International Law, spon-
sored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 3-8, 1966. See, e.g., Abl-
Saab, supra note 7, at 10 ("in the case of treaties [contrary tojus cogens] the sanction Is always
an absolute nullity, even in the inter se relations of the parties. A treaty contravening a jus
cogens rule would be void ab initio and not simply voidable, inoperative or inopposable.").
209. RESTATEMENT, supra note 107, § 331 comments e, f, g; § 102 comment k. This Re-
statement in particular is extremely authoritative and heavily relied upon because of judges'
unfamiliarity with international law and its sources. Because the Restatement is written by
experts in the field, it is itself a contribution to, as well as evidence of, international law. Char-
ney, International Agreements and the Development of Customary International Law, 61
WASH. L. REv. 971, 972 n. 8 (1986).
210. Nahlik, supra note 91, at 745.
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Contemporary treaties that directly conflict with jus cogens norms
are rare. Yet, a recent treaty between the United States and Haiti,2 '
relevant to the holding in Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey,212 allowed
the United States to capture vessels on the high seas carrying Haitians
fleeing from human rights violations in Haiti, and forcibly return vessels
and persons to Haiti. This treaty, on its face, arguably conflicts with
peremptory norms against piracy2 3 and the right of non-refoulement.1 4
The executive order 215 directing the Secretary of State to enter into this
void agreement is also void under the analogous rule that government
acts in contravention ofjus cogens are void.
B. Judicial Advantages of Jus Cogens
1. Jus Cogens Avoids Judicial Doctrines
The use ofjus cogens can help relieve plaintiffs' burden of overcom-
ing judicial doctrines that have previously appeared to be insurmountable
barriers to human rights actions. Among these are the: act of state doc-
trine; political question doctrine; various treaty doctrines such as the self-
execution doctrine and the last in time rule; and the requirements for
standing.
21 6
a. Jus Cogens Precludes the Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine, articulated in Underhill v. Hernandez,
2 17
requires courts of one nation to refrain from ruling on or providing relief
for acts done by another nation in its own territory.218 The act of state
doctrine has its basis in the idea of sovereignty of nations and interna-
tional comity.219 Many victims of human rights abuses, however, are
unable to seek relief in their own country, even when the act contravenes
jus cogens. Thus the act of state doctrine could serve to bar effective
211. Agreement, Sept. 23, 1981, United States-Haiti, T.LA.S. No. 10241.
212. 600 F. Supp. 1396 (1985), aff'd 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
213. See supra note 101 and accompanying text on piracy.
214. See supra notes 149-156 and accompanying text on non-refoulement.
215. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109, reprinted in 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (Supp.
1987).
216. Chief Justice Muhammad Haleem of the Supreme Court of Pakistan states "If these
courts cannot be harnessed, the prospects of... effective enforcement of human rights are
bleak. ... Terms such as 'act of state,' 'political question,' ... have required a different status
in the context of human rights." Haleem, The Domestic Application of International Human
Rights, in DEVELOPING HUMAN RiGHTs JURISPRUDENCE 92, 106 (1988).
217. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
218. Id. at 252.
219. See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918); Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
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remedy anywhere.220 A case arising from a violation of a jus cogens
norm would prohibit a court from deferring to the act of state doctrine,
and would require it to supply an appropriate remedy when jurisdictional
requirements are met.221
The act of state doctrine was successfully invoked to bar relief in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.222 Cuba had nationalized prop-
erty belonging to private businesses. The plaintiffs argued that nationali-
zation violated customary international law; Cuba claimed it was an act
of state, and thus not justiciable by United States courts. The Court
found that nationalization is not a violation of customary international
law, but stated that if it were, Cuba could not bar the action.223 The
Court acknowledged it possessed the power of judicial review in "areas of
international law in which consensus as to standards is greater and which
do not represent a battleground for conflicting ideologies." '224 As a defi-
nitional matter, jus cogens rules meet that requirement. The Court, faced
with an act of state defense when the underlying state action violates a
jus cogens norm, would be compelled by its own reasoning to provide
appropriate relief.
225
International human rights law as a whole abrogates traditional no-
tions of state sovereignty: states do not have the sovereign right to vio-
late human rights.226 The Restatement acknowledges the relationship
between international human rights law and the act of state doctrine: "A
claim arising out of an alleged violation of fundamental human rights-
for instance a claim on behalf of a victim of torture or genocide-would
... probably not be defeated by the act of state doctrine, since the ac-
cepted international law of human rights is well established and contem-
plates external scrutiny of such acts. ' 2 27 State acts violating jus cogens
220. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights requires that victims have available an
effective remedy for violations of rights. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 3,
art. 8.
221. The United Nations Charter obliges members to take unilateral action to defend
human rights. U.N. CHARTER, art. 56.
222. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
223. Id. at 431.
224. Id. at 430, n.34.
225. In Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, the court noted that torture committed by a Paraguayan
official in violation of international law could not be characterized as an act of state. 630 F.2d
at 889-90. Citing Sabbatino, the court would not have allowed the act of state doctrine, had it
been raised in defense, to bar relief to a victim of torture in a United States court,
226. See Comment, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and International Human
Rights Agreements: How They Co-Exist, 17 U.S.F. L. REv. 71 (1982) (authored by J. Blair &
K. Parker).
227. RFsTATEMENT, supra note 107, § 443 comment c.
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standards should preclude the use of the act of state or other immunity
doctrines to bar suits.
b. Jus Cogens Avoids the Political Question Doctrine
A claim based on ajus cogens rule is justiciable and avoids the bar-
rier of the political question doctrine because peremptory norms are
mandatory and do not allow courts to decline judicial review. The polit-
ical question doctrine requires judicial abstention in cases raising issues
more properly resolved by the executive or legislative branches of gov-
ernment.2 8 In Baker v. Carr,'29 the United States Supreme Court identi-
fied the factors mandating judicial abstention: 1) explicit constitutional
authority given to another branch of government; 2) no judicially discov-
erable and manageable standards; 3) the need for an initial policy (as
opposed to judicial) determination; 4) the impossibility of independent
resolution without impliedly undermining constitutional authority of an-
other branch; 5) an unusual need to follow a political decision already
made by the executive or legislative branches without question; or 6) the
potential for embarrassment from conflicting pronouncements by various
departments on an issue.230
Ajus cogens rule would not present any of these factors: jus cogens
is ipsojure a legal, not a political question. The United States Constitu-
tion gives judicial authority to the courts." Jus cogens is judicially dis-
coverable-United States courts have regularly utilized the customary
law, a task made easier because of the compelling nature ofjus cogens.
There is no need to pre-ascertain issues of policy because conflicting
political policy necessarily would be void. A judicial opinion, even one
affecting foreign policy, could not undermine the authority of the execu-
five or legislative branches, because neither has authority to contravene
jus cogens. Even under unusual circumstances (national security, war),
jus cogens norms are not subject to derogation.
In Crockett v. Reagan 23 2 the court invoked the Baker factors in a
suit by twenty-nine members of Congress against then-President Reagan,
challenging the legality of the United States' military presence in and
assistance to El Salvador under the War Powers Resolution 3 and the
228. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
232. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert dented,
467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
233. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1976).
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war powers clause of the Constitution.234 The court dismissed plaintiffs'
claims primarily on the ground that the claims posed nonjusticiable polit-
ical questions. The court asserted it had no judicially discoverable and
manageable standards because of its inability, due to lack of resources
and expertise available to Congress, to resolve the factual disputes of the
case as to the amount and nature of United States involvement in El
Salvador.235 However, the court did not lack legal standards: the facts,
as presented, raised serious humanitarian law violations and other viola-
tions governed by jus cogens. The court focused on inadequate facts,
conceding it could make a determination in a case with "less elusive"
facts. 236 While the whole truth of the Salvadoran situation is elusive,
facts necessary for the requested relief were presented and could have
been supplemented had the court ordered discovery. Jus cogens viola-
tions, as presented in Crockett,237 should not permit judges to invoke the
political question doctrine.
The court in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan 238 also invoked the polit-
ical question doctrine in dismissing all federal claims by a variety of
plaintiffs. The suit was brought by three groups: citizens and former
residents of Nicaragua suing in tort for injuries to themselves and their
families caused by actions of the counter-revolutionary forces in Nicara-
gua funded by and trained in the United States; members of Congress
suing to end the defendants' disregard for their right to participate in the
decision to wage war; and residents of Florida suing to enjoin the nui-
sance of the operation of at least five paramilitary camps located in their
state. Defendants included United States executive officials in their offi-
cial and individual capacities, and the operators of the paramilitary
camps. The plaintiffs alleged that United States assistance to the
counter-revolutionary forces was used for attacks on innocent Nicara-
234. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
235. 558 F. Supp. at 898.
236. Id.
237. The allegations included monetary and military aid to the junta then in power in
violation of the prohibition of the use of force (id. at 895, 897) and gross violations of human
rights and war crimes. Id. at 902. The Crockett plaintiffs also made a claim under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, which specifies that no "security assistance be given to any country...
which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights." Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 502B as amended, 22 U.S.C.A. section 2304,
quoted in 558 F. Supp. at 902. The court, noting that plaintiffs' claim was supported with
"voluminous documentation," denied relief based on equitable discretion rather than on polit-
ical question. Id. Because of the peremptory nature ofjus cogens, judges have no discretion
when ajus cogens violation is alleged. On appeal, Circuit Court Judge Bork rejected the equi-
table discretion doctrine and based his concurring opinion on the issue of standing. 720 F,2d
1355, at 1357 (Bork, J., concurring).
238. 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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guan civilians, resulting in the summary execution, murder, abduction,
torture, rape, and physical injury of people and property, and sought re-
lief under the Alien Tort Claims Act.239 The court invoked the act of
state doctrine and sovereign immunity on the ground that the officials
named, in their capacity as private parties, did not violate international
law.2' The court, disregarding thejus cogens implications of the alleged
acts,24 1 never reached the international law rule making government offi-
cials personally responsible for their acts.242 The court held that defend-
ants, as government agents, could invoke sovereign immunity as a bar to
the suit, thus impermissibly depriving the plaintiffs of any remedy against
possiblejus cogens violations.243
c. Jus Cogens Avoids the Self-Execution Doctrine and the Last in
Time Rule
The self-execution doctrine requires that treaties (or clauses of trea-
ties) "operate of [themselves], without the aid of any legislative provi-
sions" for them to be justiciable.2' The best current test for self-
execution was formulated by Professor Stephan Riesenfeld: self-execu-
tion is favored when treaties grant rights to persons, when the parties
lack discretion to fulfill an obligation and when no further Congressional
action is necessary to fulfill the treaty obligations.245
A claim based on ajus cogens violation is actionable independently
of a treaty. It is therefore irrelevant whether the government in question
has ratified a particular treaty, whether the treaty is self-executing or not,
or whether there is implementing legislation.
In Diggs v. Richardson2I the use ofjus cogens might have overcome
the court's reliance on the self-execution doctrine to deny judicial en-
forcement of prohibitions against apartheid. In Diggs, the court dis-
missed a suit by multiple plaintifs24 7 seeking judicial enforcement of
239. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). The Alien Tort Claims Act provides relief in tort for viola-
tions of international law.
240. 770 F.2d at 206-07.
241. The facts indicate, inter alia, violations constituting grave breaches of humanitarian
law. See supra notes 129-148 and accompanying text.
242. See eg., supra note 137 and accompanying text.
243. 770 F.2d at 206-07.
244. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 254 (1829).
245. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and United States v. Postak Win
at Any Price? 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892 (1980).
246. 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
247. Members of Congress, a Namibian refugee, the South West Africa People's Organiza-
tion. Id. at n.1.
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United Nations Security Council Resolution 301.248 The United States
voted for this resolution. The resolution calls on states to abstain from
any diplomatic or economic relationships with South Africa on behalf of
or concerning Namibia because of South Africa's continued illegal pres-
ence there.249 The plaintiffs contended that this resolution was legally
binding on the United States, and that therefore negotiations by the
United States Department of Commerce regarding the importation of
seal furs from Namibia were illegal. The court held that the Security
Council resolution is not self-executing, and as a result, plaintiffs had no
standing to enforce it.25
The issues raised in Diggs involved a number of jus cogens norms:
apartheid;251 the illegal use of force by South Africa to occupy
Namibia;252 and South Africa's violation of the Namibian peoples' right
to self-determination.2"3 Jus cogens rules should confer on plaintiffs an
enforceable cause of action against its violator and those who enable the
violation, regardless of a court's determination that Security Council res-
olutions are not self-executing. 254
In Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey,2" the court denied relief to
Haitian refugees for the harm caused by the United States' interdiction
program, 25 6 in part on its determination that the relevant provisions of
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees257 were not self-
executing.25 8 The court believed that without legislation to implement
the treaty, plaintiffs had no justiciable rights. The court disregarded the
jus cogens nature of the right of non-refoulement and the prohibition
against piracy, which are binding and enforceable apart from the treaty.
The last in time rule addresses the situation in which a treaty and
domestic law obviously conflict:259 the rule holds that the later expres-
248. 26 U.N. SCOR, (1598th Mtg.) at 7 (1971).
249. Id.
250. 555 F.2d at 851.
251. See supra notes 171-179 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 157-163 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 180-191 and accompanying text. Some commentators claim that the
obligation to respect the non-derogability ofjus cogens is ajus cogens norm.
254. Security Council Resolutions are legally binding on all member states of the United
Nations. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(S.W. Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.CJ. 9, 52-54,
58.
255. 600 F. Supp. 1396 (1985) aff'd on other grounds 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
256. Supra notes 211-215 and accompanying text (Haitian interdiction program).
257. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 4.
258. 600 F. Supp. at 1405-06.
259. Courts must try to construe acts of Congress and treaties in conformity with each
other. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
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sion prevails.2" This rule can have no effect on a jus cogens norm, for
the obvious reason thatjus cogens norms exist and are enforceable apart
from treaties. Equally obvious, any act or treaty that conflicts with ajus
cogens norm is void-such a conflicting document does not legally exist.
Furthermore, an existing treaty (or provision of a treaty), or an existing
legislative act that does not, on its face, violatejus cogens norms, can not
be used to justify upholding laws or acts that do violatejus cogens norms.
The Board of Immigration Appeals misapplied the last in time rule
in In Re Medina.26' The board, denying an order to withhold deporta-
tion of a woman who fled armed conflict in El Salvador and sought relief
based on her right of non-refoulement,262 refused to recognize that the
right of non-refoulement is a norm of customary international law.263
Even more disturbing, the board also found that even if the right of non-
refoulement were a norm of customary international law, the board con-
sidered the later Refugee Act of 1980111 as controlling legislation. 265 The
use of subsequent legislation to defeat customary international law, par-
ticularly law that has becomejus cogens, demonstrates a misunderstand-
ing of the nature ofjus cogens. Jus cogens norms, like all customary law,
is "made" every day, and hence is always the last in time. Even if the
board tried to join in the administration's effort to persistently object to
the norm of non-refoulement, its presentjus cogens character overrides
all such attempts.
266
Attempts to characterize the Refugee Act of 1980 as the last in time
in order to defeat provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,267
whether considered self-executing or not,2 " are also invalid. The 1980
act is silent about abrogating United States obligations under the Geneva
260. The later act must openly conflict with the earlier one. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18
n.34 (1957).
261. Bd. of Imm. Appeals No. A26949415, slip op. (Interim Decision 3078) Oct. 7, 1988.
262. See supra note 149.
263. In its argument, the board cited reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees only up to Spring 1985. Medina, slip op. at 13. The board appears to purposefully
disregard the subsequent reports of the High Commissioner indicating that non.refoulement,
as applied to persons fleeing armed conflicts, is not only binding customary law, butjus cogens.
See, eg., Report of U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 154; Report of U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 5-6, U.N. Doc. A/41/12
(1986).
264. 94 STAT. 102.
265. Medina, slip op. at 13.
266. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
267. Geneva Conventions, supra note 4.
268. The Medina board also appears to purposefully disregard the prior findings of the
International Court of Justice regarding the obligations arising under Article 1 of the Geneva
Conventions of all parties to respect the rights of victims of armed conflicts in all circum-
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Conventions.269 Though it has not yet done so, the United States is free
to denounce the Geneva Conventions. In order to do so effectively, it
must comply with the denunciation procedure set out in the conventions;
denunciation "shall be notified in writing to the Swiss Federal Govern-
ment, which shall transmit it to governments of all the High Contracting
Parties. ' 270 Such a denunciation, however, would not relieve the United
States of its obligations under jus cogens norms of 'humanitarian law.271
Moreover, the Geneva Conventions and the Refugee Act in no way con-
ffict, because under the rule of Whitney v. Robertson, 2  they can clearly
be construed in conformity with each other. In Medina 273, the board,
assuming arguendo that non-refoulement is a norra of customary law,
found it inconsistent with their claim that the Refugee Act limits immi-
gration judges' authority to grant non-refoulement.2" 4 While the Refugee
Act does intend to "establish a single, comprehensive basis" ' 275 to meet
obligations regarding refugees, it does not repudiate the provision grant-
ing immigration judges authority "to take any.., action consistent with
applicable law and regulations as may be appropriate." 276 Immigration
judges are bound to apply the whole of immigration law, which "includes
... all laws, conventions, and treaties of the United States relating to...
deportation, or expulsion of aliens. 277
d. Jus Cogens Provides Standing
The harm caused by violations of jus cogens affect all persons,
whether actual victims, or incidental ones. Because all persons are
harmed, each should have standing to bring a suit for redress. The
standing requirement, as used in United States courts, has clearly frus-
trated attempts to remedy alleged human rights violations. Direct vic-
tims of a violation ofjus cogens are often not in a position to bring suit
stances, even when a country is not involved in the armed conflict. See Nicear. v. U.S. case,
supra note 1, at 14. In any casejus cogens norms are always self-executing.
269. Silence is not sufficient to overturn prior statutes or abrogate treaties. Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957).
270. Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, (armed forces in the field), art. 63; (armed forces at
sea), art. 62; (prisoners of war), art. 142; (civilians), art. 158.
271. Id.
272. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). See supra note 259 and accompany-
ing text.
273. Bd. of Imm. Appeals, No. A26949415, slip op. (Interim Decision 3078) Oct. 7, 1988.
274. Id.
275. Medina, slip op. at 13.
276. 8 C.F.R. § 242.8(a).
277. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (a)(17)(emphasis added).
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themselves, and must rely on third parties to seek judicial relief.37 8 Such
was the case in Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey,2 9 where the direct
victims of the United States' interdiction program280 had been forcibly
repatriated to Haiti, and were not able to bring an action in any court
themselves. Judge Bork, in a separate opinion of a divided panel denying
standing, wrote that the plaintiff Refugee Center, whose purpose it was
to help Haitian refugees, was not within the "zone of interest"2 11 neces-
sary for standing to bring an action on behalf on the Haitians injured by
the interdiction program.2 2
In Warth v. Seldin,283 a town's zoning ordinance banning low in-
come residences was alleged to be racially discriminatory because it ex-
cluded minorities from the town. Plaintiffs included two non-profit
corporations which helped low and moderate income people with hous-
ing problems, area taxpayers, low-income and minority residents, and an
association of area construction firms, all alleging monetary or other in-
jury caused by the discriminatory ordinance. The Court dismissed each
plaintiff's claim for lack of standing because of a failure to show individ-
ual harm, effectively eliminating the possibility of a remedy for this insid-
ious use of zoniing.
211
The requirement of individual harm was set out in Sierra Club v.
Morton.285 A conservation group sought to prevent federal approval of
an extensive skiing development in a secluded valley in Sequoia National
Forest, on the grounds that the development would irreparably damage
the area's ecology and aesthetics. The Court dismissed the case, claiming
the Sierra Club could not show individualized harm.286 Judge Black-
278. The actual victims may be in other countries, may be dead, injured, or otherwise
unable to bring an action. In the case brought to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights on behalf of institutionalized mental patients, nineteen of the victims were dead and the
others were under commitment with no legal power to act. See Case 9213 (United States),
supra note 121.
279. 600 F. Supp. 1396 (1985) aff'd 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
280. See interdiction program, supra note 211-215.
281. 809 F.2d at 811.
282. Compare id. at 811-16 with Case 9213 (United States), supra note 120 (standing found
for Disabled Peoples' International and International Disability Law on behalf of Grenadan
mentally disabled victims of United States bombing attack on hospital).
283. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
284. Id. at 508-11, 514, 517-18. J. Brennan, joined by J. White and J. Marshall in his
dissent, wrote that "the opinion... tosses out of court almost every conceivable kind of
plaintiff who could be injured by the activity... ." Id. at 520. Racial discrimination is widely
acknowledged to violate jus cogens. See notes 105-108 and accompanying text. Zoning as
illustrated by the Warth facts is arguably apartheid.
285. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
286. Id. As early as 1955, some members of the Human Rights Commission agreed that
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mun, frustrated by the majority's use of standing as a barrier to legal
remedies for general, universal harm, wrote in his dissenting opinion:
"Must our law be so rigid and our procedural concepts so inflexible that
we render ourselves helpless when the existing methods and the tradi-
tional concepts do not quite fit and do not prove to be entirely adequate
for new issues?",
287
Some judges take a restrictive view of the concept of standing and
consider it to be similar to that of possessing a recognizable cause of
action. 88 International Court of Justice Judge Ammoun has stated that
in international law, an action to safeguard jus cogens rights does not
require a plaintiff's personal and direct interest for judicial action.289 Be-
cause rights protected by jus cogens rules are held by all in common,
every person has individualized harm by their violation. Accordingly,
every person has a right to seek redress.290
the right to life requires States to take positive steps to protect the environment. 10 U.N.
GAOR Annex (Agenda item 28 (Part II)) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955). (annotation of
draft international covenants on human rights prepared by the Secretary-General).
287. 405 U.S. at 755-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
288. See Judge Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 803 n.8
(D.C. Cir. 1984). For a discussion on Judge Bork's position, see D'Amato, What Does Tel-
Oren Tell Lawyers? 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92, 101-05.
289. 1970 I.C.J. at 325 (Ammoun, J., separate opinion).
290. In addition to clearing away some judicial barriers, jus cogens may provide protection
for persons or classes of persons whose rights under international instruments are not fully
recognized in domestic law. Racial discrimination is widely considered to violatejus cogens,
yet gender-based discrimination is as offensive to human rights as discrimination on any other
ground. The United Nations Charter itself especially addresses gender-based discrimination.
U.N. CHARTER, 2d declar. para. and art. 1(3). Realization of the equality of women has been
frustrated by the failure to pass an Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, and the second-class status ("intermediate scrutiny") of women in the "suspect class"
doctrine. Full recognition of the equality of women and men as a jus cogens norm would
oblige courts to redress discrimination, even in the absence of judicial precedent, domestic
legislation, or Constitutional standards. See generally Note, Customary International Law and
Women's Rights: The Equal Rights Amendment as a Fait Accompli, 1987 DET. C. L. Rv. 121
(1987) (authored by J. Guertin). In cases involving aliens,jus cogens norms can provide mean.
ingful protection because aliens do not enjoy the full range of Constitutional rights granted
citizens. Because of the unique position of Native Americans in the United States, jus cogens
norms may be especially powerful to protect their rights. A serious setback to Native Ameri-
cans' rights recently occurred when the United States Supreme Court, in Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. -, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988), held that First Amend-
ment religious freedom rights do not protect lands sacred to local tribes. The Court, by refus-
ing to acknowledge the land-based nature of Indian religions, left [ndians with no meaningful
protection of their sacred lands. This opinion contravenes the jus cogens standards of self-
determination, genocide, and fundamental human rights. See, e.g., International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 40 at art. 27 (ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities




2. Jus Cogens Allows for Universal Jurisdiction
Jus cogens norms naturally call for universal jurisdiction for their
enforcement: violations ofjus cogens norms disrupt international order,
and thus affect all states and persons.2 91 Jurisdiction is found over al-
leged violators in their personal capacity.
The idea of universal jurisdiction and individual responsibility for
violations of international law developed largely with the laws of war. At
the end of World War II, an ad hoc international court, established by
the Nuremberg Charter,292 exercised jurisdiction over World War II war
criminals. Reinforcing individual responsibility, the tribunal stated:
"the very essence of the Charter [establishing the tribunal] is that indi-
viduals have international duties which transcend the national obliga-
tions of obedience imposed by the individual State."2 93 Sincejus cogens
obligations transcend national boundaries, jurisdiction over violations of
these international standards must be universal. A major step in devel-
oping universal jurisdiction forjus cogens violations is the War Crimes
Convention,294 which requires states to provide for universal jurisdiction.
The War Crimes Convention enumerates war crimes and expands the
definition of crimes against humanity as set out in the Nuremberg Char-
ter by adding acts committed in time of peace to those occurring in war,
specifically apartheid and genocide.295 An aspect of universal jurisdic-
tion is personal jurisdiction by all states over the alleged violator of such
crimes.
296
Universal jurisdiction is also an important part of the Geneva Con-
ventions. The grave breach article in each of the four Geneva Conven-
tions is followed by a common article stating: "No High Contracting
291. As one author put it, "[tihe human rights violator is, like the pirate, hostis humani
generis, an enemy of all mankind, and jurisdiction to punish his violations is universal." A.
D'AMATo, supra note 7, at 107.
292. The Nuremberg Charter, supra note 137.
293. United States v. Goering, 6 FRD 69, 110 (1946), relying on the Nuremberg Charter,
art. 6, 59 Stat. at 1547 and art. 8, 59 Stat. at 1548. See also 41 AM. . INT'L L. 127, 221 (1947);
U.S. Army Field Manual Sec. 498, 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (1956) ("Any person,
whether a member of the armed forces or a civilian, who commits an act which constitutes a
crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment. Such offenses
in connection with war comprise: a. crimes against peace. b. crimes against humanity. c. war
crimes.. ."); Report of the International Law Commission To the General Assembly, 5 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in [1950] II Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 364, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1950/Add.1 (1950).
294. War Crimes Convention, supra note 111.
295. Id. art. 1(b).
296. I art. 2. As a general rule, however, alleged violations should be tried in the "coun-
tries in which they committed those crimes." G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 30) at 79, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
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Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any ofher High Contracting
Party of any liability incurred by itself or by any other High Contracting
Party in respect of breaches referred to in the preceding Article." 297 An-
other common article of the Geneva Conventions requires all parties to
either try alleged violators of grave breaches in their own courts-re-
gardless of the nationality of the violator--or to hand over alleged viola-
tors to another party.2 98
Universal jurisdiction is a prominent part of other international
treaties codifying human rights jus cogens norms. For example, the
Apartheid Convention2 9 9 provides that violators can be tried in a domes-
tic tribunal of any state party or by an international penal tribunal.3°°
This Convention also obliges state parties to adopt any measures neces-
sary to allow domestic jurisdiction." 1 The Torture Convention 0 2 pro-
vides for jurisdiction over any offender found in a state territory.
30 3 It
also requires states to allow victim suits to redress torture, including "an
enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation. ' ' 3 4 Dependents of
persons who die as a result of torture are also entitled to compensa-
tion. 305 The Genocide Convention also provides for universal
jurisdiction. 0 6
V. JUS COGENS IN UNITED STATES JURISPRUDENCE
The term jus cogens is rarely used in United States jurisprudence in
spite of its universal acceptance and its status as a fundamental legal con-
cept. However, the concept ofjus cogens is not absent from American
law. It has played a significant role in American jurisprudence from the
beginning of the American nation. 7
The debate about judicial application of universal standards has
often been framed as part of the question: does the United States Consti-
297. Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, (armed forces in the field), art. 51; (armed forces at
sea), art. 52; (prisoners of war), art. 131; (civilians), art. 148.
298. Id. (armed forces in the field), art. 49; (armed forces at sea), art. 50; (prisoners of war),
art. 129; (civilians), art. 146.
299. Apartheid Convention, supra note 177.
300. Id. art. V.
301. Id. art. IV.
302. Torture Convention, supra note 152.
303. Id. art. 5.2.
304. Id. art. 14.
305. Id.; see Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
306. Genocide Convention, supra note 4, art. VI.




tution and the rights it protects evolve?3"' Most anti-evolutionists insist
on literal Constitutional interpretation, claiming the evolutionary func-
tion properly belongs to the legislature, not the judiciary.3°9 Justice
Black pleads this argument in his dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut.310
Most courts, however, have incorporated analysis of fundamental stan-
dards as they are understood contemporaneously, usingjus cogens analy-
sis, though not the term '7fus cogens.'"311
A. Use of Jus Cogens Principles in the Incorporation of the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment
A fruitful area in which to observe thejus cogens analysis in United
States courts is in cases involving the incorporation of rights contained in
the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.
Judges taking on the evolutionary mantle emphasize the fundamental
quality of rights and principles and the fairness of the outcome rather
308. See generally Reinstein, The Evolution of Individual Rights from the Constitution's
Original Intent, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 197 (1988); Fisher, Methods of Constitutional Interpreta-
don: the Limits of Original Intent, 18 CuMB. L. REv. 43 (1988); Phelps & Martinez, Brennan
v. Rehnquist" the Politics of Constitutional Jurisprudence, 22 Golz. L. REv. 307 (1987); Ball,
The Convergence of Constitutional Law and Politics in the Reagan Administration: the Exhu-
mation of the 'Jurisprudence of Original Intention' Doctrine, 17 CuMB. L. REv. 877 (1987).
309. See, eg., Justice Black's dissents in: Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947);
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-55 (1959); and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377 (1970).
See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L 3. 1, 8 (1971);
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L J. 920, 949 (1973)
(the right to privacy is not in the Constitution); Reid, The Rehnquist Court and Constitutional
Interpretation, 30 How. L. J. 1189 (1987).
310. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-13 (1965)
("The due process argument. . . is based... on the premise that this Court is vested
with power to invalidate all state laws that it considers to be arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable, or oppressive, or on this Court's belief that a particular state law... is
offensive to a 'sense of fairness and justice.' If these formulas based on 'natural jus-
tice'.., are to prevail, they require judges to determine what is or is not constitu-
tional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary.
The power to make such decisions is of course that of a legislative body... I do not
believe that we are granted power .. .'to measure constitutionality by our belief that
legislation is... offensive to our own notions of 'civilized standards of conduct.'
Such an appraisal of the wisdom of legislation is an attribute of the power to make
laws, not of the power to interpret them.").
311. See, eg., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (segregation in public
school no longer acceptable); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage between people
of different races constitutionally protected); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (children have
constitutionally protected rights); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (detainee must
know right against self-incrimination in custodial surroundings); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) (Amish children may have alternate education to public schools). In private law,
"immoral" contracts are not enforceable. Whether or not they are immoral has always been
according to the eye of the judicial observer.
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than specific, written constitutional provisions. For instance, in In Re
Kemmler,312 the United States Supreme Court declared "those funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions" '313 must be included in due process as ap-
plied to the states. The Kemmler test was further developed in subse-
quent cases. In Twining v. New Jersey,314 for example, the Court
considered whether the right against self-incrimination was such a funda-
mental principle and found it was not.315 The Court invoked "immuta-
ble principles of justice" '316 and questioned whether the right "inheres in
the very idea of free government." The Court also tested the right's
universality, scanning, for instance, the laws of "civilized countries,"
31 7
and the writings of scholars and jurists.
318
As standards evolve, earlier decisions are reversed. Twining was
overturned by Malloy v. Hogan.31 9 In Betts v. Brady,320 the Court found
the denial of the right to appointed counsel for indigents in criminal cases
did not "shock ... the universal sense of justice. ' '32.1 In Gideon v. Wain-
wright, the Court reached the opposite conclusion.322 In Palko v. Con-
necticut,323 the Court concluded that the prohibition against double
312. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
313. Id. at 448. Prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was found not to rise to
this standard.
314. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
315. Id. at 102, 113-14. In Twining, a New Jersey judge, during a misdemeanor trial, com-
mented extensively on Twining's exercise of his right not to incriminate himself. The judge
strongly suggested the defendant was guilty because of his unwillingness to testify, and a state
law permitted such an inference to be drawn. Twining contended this law violated the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by abridging the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States, and deprived him of due process of law. The Court
concluded that the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination is not a privilege or immu-
nity of national citizenship, although it might be a right inherent in state citizenship. The test
was also used in Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 315-16 (1926) (one act may be separate
offenses under federal and state law and would not constitute double jeopardy), which was
subsequently quoted in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) and Palko v. Connecticut
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
316. 211 U.S. at 102, 106. The Court cited Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)
("[Tlhere are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government which no member of the Union may disregard.").
317. 211 U.S. at 102-08, 113.
318. Id.
319. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
320. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
321. Id., at 462, 471-73.
322. 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963) (provision of counsel in all criminal cases is "a fundamen-
tal right essential to a fair trial" and applicable to the states).
323. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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jeopardy is "not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."'"3
The Palko Court focused on the concept of the "traditions and con-
science of our people" in analyzing rights. 3- 5 Following this rule, the
Court later overturned the result reached in Palko.
326
B. Use of Jus Cogens Principles to Find Unenumerated
Constitutional Rights
Judicial enforcement of unwritten fundamental principles also dem-
onstrates the operation of jus cogens: the Supreme Court has found
rights in the Constitution that are not enumerated in the document itself.
For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut327 and Roe v. Wade,328 the
Court found the right of privacy to be present in the Constitution even
though the Constitution never utilizes the term. In Griswold, the Court
found the right of marital privacy to be "older than the Bill of
Rights," 329 and indicated that the right is found "within the zone of pri-
vacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees."33 Writ-
ing for the Court, Justice Douglas invoked a "penumbra!"33 surrounding
certain written constitutional provisions sufficient to engender additional
rights. Justice Goldberg relied on a virtually uninterpreted Ninth
Amendment 332 as well as substantive due process 333 to find a constitu-
tional right of privacy. In Roe v. Wade,334 the Court relied on fundamen-
tal due process to find that a woman's right to choose abortion is
protected by the right of privacy.
335
324. Id. at 325.
325. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
326. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
327. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
328. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
329. 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
330. Id. at 485.
331. Id. at 484-85.
332. Id. at 487-93, 499. (Goldberg, J., concurring). The Ninth Amendment provides:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX
333. 381 U.S. at 486-88, 496-99 (Goldberg, J, concurring). Chief Justice Warren and Jus-
tice Brennan joined this concurrence. The idea of fundamental rights as part of substantive
due process came into disfavor after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), where the
Court struck down protective legislation for the hours bakers could work on the ground that
the right to contract to buy or sell labor is a Fourteenth Amendment due process right. Justice
Black's dissent in Griswold, as in other cases discussed in this Article, was in part based on
Lochner and its "natural law due process philosophy." 381 U.S. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting).
Black does not acknowledge the Court's error in Lochner.
334. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
335. Id. at 153, 155.
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C. The Use of Jus Cogens Principles to Proscribe Government
Misconduct
Jus cogens principles are used to determine whether government
acts are acceptable. In Malinski v. New York,3 36 the United States
Supreme Court demanded "civilized standards," '337 where a suspect was
stripped, held incommunicado, and humiliated by police to obtain a con-
fession. Similarly, the Court condemned government conduct when a
prisoner died from an asthma attack while incarcerated because of
grossly inadequate medical facilities, a lack of competent medical care,
the administration of contraindicated drugs, and I:he use of a respirator
known to be inoperable.338
A common measure used by courts to evaluate governmental con-
duct is whether it shocks the conscience. This standard was articulated
in Rochin v. California,339 where police officers forcibly induced vomiting
to obtain swallowed evidence from a suspect. The Court acknowledged
its "inescapabl[e] ''340 responsibility to proscribe conduct that violates
principles of justice rooted in "compelling" legal traditions.34' The
Court concluded the conduct of the officers "shocks the conscience."
342
The United States Supreme Court has also required that laws or
governmental conduct must not violate "rights... basic to our free soci-
ety."' 343 The government cannot act contrary to "deeply rooted feelings
of the community,"' 3 " or "fundamental notions of fairness and jus-
336. 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
337. Id. at 414.
338. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
339. 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (deliberate and excessive infliction of pain in prison secur-
ity measures "shocks the conscience" and "affords brutality the cloak of law").
340. Id. at 169.
341. Id. at 171. (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
342. 342 U.S. at 172. Other cases where police or State conduct has been held to shock the
conscience are: Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 1981) (excessive force in the
performance of police duties such as brandishing a revolver in another's face and filing unwar-
ranted charges against the victim in retaliation for victim's complaint); Curtis v. Everette, 489
F.2d 516, 518-19 (3d Cir. 1973), cert denied 416 U.S. 995 (prevention by prison personnel of
prisoner from defending self when attacked by other prisoners in their presence); U.S. ex rtl
Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wisc. 1974) (two visual vaginal searches of woman
seven months pregnant by female police officers with no medical training not in a medical
environment). In U.S. v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378, 382, 387 (D.D.C. 1957), police forced a
suspect to submit to the swabbing of his genitals by police in order to get a blood sample and
then beat him up and denied him a lawyer; the court considexed the police conduct to be
"highly offensive" and to "shock the conscience."
343. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). As early as 1810, the Court had recognized
the principle of inviolability of vested economic rights. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810).
344. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 604 (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion) (1948).
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tice,"345 or in a way that "den[ies] ... fundamental fairness [which is]
shocking to the universal sense of justice.""34 Not all behavior that vio-
lates international norms has been found to shock the conscience. For
instance, in some prison cases courts have ignored the United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 347 in upholding
treatment in clear violation of international minimum standards."4 In
other prison cases, courts have invoked the United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules to find that treatment of prisoners violated their
rights.
3 4 9
D. Use of Jus Cogens Principles in Cases Directly Invoking
International Law
Jus cogens principles appear in United States jurisprudence in cases
invoking international law as well as in cases resolved by domestic law.
Often judges reach forjus cogens principles because American statutory,
constitutional, or customary law does not appear to address the issue
before them or, if applied in its strictest sense, would yield an unjust
result.
In M.A. v. US. Immigration and Naturalization Service,"5 the
court, remanding a deportation order, held that M.A., a native and citi-
zen of El Salvador, had presented a prima facie case for political asylum
based on his assertion that he would face induction into military service
in an army which commits war crimes. 51 The court, concluding that the
Salvadoran army violates article three of the Geneva Conventions by in-
humane treatment of civilians, murder, torture and summary executions,
invoked section 171 of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees Handbook,52 and held that M.A. had shown he would suffer dispro-
345. Id. at 607 (Burton, J., dissenting).
346. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
347. U.N. Standard Minimum Rules on the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 165.
348. See, eg., Sostre v. McGinnis 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert denied 405 U.S. 978
(1972) (indefinite solitary confinement not cruel or unusual punishment); Ford v. Board of
Managers, 407 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1969) (prisoner held with no running water or wash bowl and
fed bread and water with only one regular meal every third day held constitutional).
349. See eg., Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980), modified 651 F.2d 96
(2d Cir. 1981) (Standard Minimum Rules used to determine overcrowding); Sterling v. Cupp,
290 Or 611 (1981) (pat down of genital area by guard of opposite sex found to violate, inter
alta, Standard Minimum Rules).
350. 858 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1988), petition for reh'g en banc granted (1989).
351. Id. at 219.
352. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCE-
DURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 40 (1979). Section 171 pro-
vides: "Where, however, the type of military action is condemned by the international
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portionately severe punishment on account of his refusal to serve in the
army.
353
In United States v. Toscanino,354 the court provided relief for an
alien who alleged he was tortured by United States government agents in
Uruguay, and then kidnapped by them and brought to the United States
for the purpose of obtaining federal court jurisdiction over him. The Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, in remanding, reasoned that an earlier case disal-
lowing aliens a remedy for government kidnapping outside the United
States355 had been undermined, and invoked the Rochin standard ("this
is conduct that shocks the conscience" 356) and Justice Brandeis' dissent
in Olmstead v. United States:35 7 "If the Government becomes a law-
breaker, it breeds contempt for the law ... it invites anarchy." 358 The
court also found that the claim of international kidnapping, if true,
would violate the plaintiff's rights under the United Nations Charter, the
Charter of the Organization of American States and customary interna-
tional law, for which the remedy is the return of the kidnapped victim,3 5 9
Courts have applied international law in cases involving misconduct
of agents or officials of the United States government in the United States
as well. In Fernandez v. Wilkinson,3 1° although the court found that in-
determinate detention of a person in a maximum security prison pending
unforeseeable deportation constitutes an arbitrary detention,3 6 1 the court
could find no remedy under the United States Constitution or any stat-
ute, because of the defendant's status as an excludable alien refugee. 62
Failing to find any relevant domestic law, the court looked to customary
international law to determine the applicable standard regarding the
right to freedom from arbitrary detention.363 Having concluded that ex-
community . . . punishment for . . . draft evasion could . . .in itself be regarded as
persecution."
353. 858 F.2d at 217-18.
354. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), reh'g denied 508 F.2d 1380 (2 Cir. 1974).
355. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). The plaintiff in Ker was forcibly abducted In
Peru by a Pinkerton agent and brought to Illinois to stand trial -for embezzlement.
356. 500 F.2d at 273, (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
357. 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
358. Id. at 485.
359. 500 F.2d 267, 277-78 ("The resolution merely recognized a long standing principle of
international law that abductions by one state of persons located within the territory of an.
other violate the territorial sovereignty of the second state and are redressable usually by the
return of the person kidnapped.").
360. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernan.
dez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
361. 505 F. Supp. at 794.
362. Id. at 795-98.
363. To determine the customary law, the court considered numerous international
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isting customary international law prohibits arbitrary detention, that the
plaintiff had a claim based on that law, and that his detention had vio-
lated international law, the court ordered his release. 3"
VI. CONCLUSION
The forty years since the promulgation of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights365 have generated hope that developing standards of
law would result in a higher realization of justice in domestic actions and
in an enhanced outlook for justice, peace and cooperation among nations.
A major result of that hope has been the increasing vitality of the princi-
ple ofjus cogens and its developing predominance in international law.
The use of jus cogens in human rights actions should overcome court-
invoked barriers to redress and should be a compelling factor in the pro-
gressive enforcement of human rights.
sources, including United Nations instruments and declarations, multilateral treaties, articles
by legal scholars of international law, and statements of members of the United States govern-
ment. The court even cited the inscription on the Statue of Liberty. Id. at 795-99.
364. /,M at 800. The court stated: "Perpetuating a state of affairs which results in the
violation of an alien's fundamental human rights is clearly an abuse of discretion on the part of
the responsible agency officials. This court is bound to declare such an abuse and to order its
cessation." Id. at 799.
365. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 3.
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